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Abstract 
 
We analyze the equity portfolio composition of investment funds of 15 European 
countries. We find that these institutions tend to prefer larger, more liquid, high 
dividend, low volatility stocks that belong to the main stock market indices. These 
results are consistent with previous studies that analyze institutional preferences for 
stock characteristics. These results are also consistent with theories of “prudent” 
behavior by institutions and are robust to factors such as funds within sample with small 
numbers of stocks and to funds with unusually large holdings relative to the number of 
outstanding shares of a single company. We also compare institutional preferences 
between sub-groups of funds. We find no relevant differences between the stock 
preferences of funds from PIIGS countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain) 
versus those of funds from the other countries; also, no significant differences between 
different fund investment styles; and also, no relevant differences between preferences 
before and during the advent of the recent financial crisis in Europe. We also find 
similar preferences between funds located in countries that adopted the Euro and funds 
from the other countries, except for the variable stock price. Additionally, we find that 
funds that are more inclined to invest in the long-term exhibit more evident behaviors of 
“prudence” than funds more focused on the short-term. 
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Resumo 
Nesta dissertação, analisamos a composição das carteiras de ações dos fundos de 
investimento de 15 países Europeus. Concluímos que estas instituições tendem a 
preferir ações de empresas de maior dimensão, com maior liquidez, com dividendos  
elevados, em que as ações têm baixa volatilidade e pertencem aos principais índices 
bolsistas. Estes resultados estão em concordância com estudos anteriores que analisam 
as preferências dos fundos quanto às características das ações. Estes resultados estão 
também em concordância com teorias de comportamento “prudente” por parte das 
instituições e mantêm-se robustos face a fatores como a existência na amostra de fundos 
com um baixo número de posições e fundos que detêm posições anormalmente elevadas 
relativamente ao número de ações em circulação de uma empresa. 
 Nesta investigação, também comparamos as preferências entre subgrupos de 
instituições. Não encontramos diferenças significativas entre as preferências dos fundos 
dos países intitulados “PIIGS” (Portugal, Irlanda, Itália, Grécia e Espanha) e as dos 
fundos dos restantes países; também não encontramos diferenças relevantes entre 
diferentes estilos de investimento por parte dos fundos; e também não encontramos 
diferenças significativas entre as preferências antes e durante a crise financeira que 
afetou a Europa nos últimos anos. Por outro lado, os nossos resultados são similares 
entre os fundos localizados em países que adotaram o Euro e os localizados nos outros 
países, salvo relativamente à variável preço das ações. Adicionalmente, os nossos 
resultados sugerem que os Fundos de Investimento mais predispostos a investir em 
horizontes de longo prazo tendem a demonstrar comportamentos mais “prudentes” do 
que os fundos mais focados em prazos mais curtos. 
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1. Introduction 
 The equity market has seen a dramatic shift in the profile of the typical investor. 
In 1950, more than 90% of the total U.S. equity market was controlled by individuals 
(Friedman, 1996). Institutions, like banks, pension funds, mutual funds, insurance 
companies and others owned a very small fraction of the market. Meanwhile, as time 
progressed, a considerable growth in institutional ownership took place. Portfolios 
under management by institutions gradually became larger, assuming more than 50% of 
the total U.S. equity market in the 1990’s (Friedman, 1996). This trend of growing 
institutional ownership has since then continued, and in recent years has allowed 
institutions to further reinforce their dominating position. In 2008, assets under 
management by institutions were reported at 68% of total managed assets (Blume and 
Keim, 2011) and volume traded on exchanges by institutions is estimated to account for 
70% of total traded volume (Schwartz and Shapiro, 1992). 
 This progressive growth in institutional dominance has increased the need for 
research on institutional activity, institutional behavior and its impact on financial 
markets. While institutions as a group can be quite heterogeneous, they have certain 
characteristics that distinguish them from individuals. Bennet et al. (2003) describe that 
institutions (1) typically control much larger portfolios, which leads to economies of 
scale in areas such as investment research and trade execution; (2) are usually evaluated 
and compensated based on investment performance, leading to similarities in incentives; 
and (3) face constraints that can affect their investment decisions (e.g. prudent-man 
regulations, which are laws that seek to protect clients of those institutions). These 
common factors can affect institutional investment decisions and are therefore of 
interest from an academic perspective. 
 This dissertation aims to help analyze and document institutional behavior, the 
variables that institutions take into account in their decisions, and the impact of their 
decisions on the financial markets. We aim to help improve our understanding on 
institutional behavior by developing and extending previous studies done on this area, 
examining in particular the behavior of European investment funds. 
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Institutional behavior in financial markets 
 Many institutions are involved in the management of assets that belong to other 
investors in a so-called fiduciary relationship, in which they act as agents on behalf of 
others instead of managing assets that belong to them. In this relationship, institutions 
are conceded the right to manage assets from usually smaller investors, making pools of 
assets and managing the assembled pool. Their objective is to maximize the returns 
achieved for a chosen level of risk, and in compensation they charge a set of fees for 
their services. 
 A good relation between institutions and their clients is one in which both parties 
are satisfied with the results. Institutions usually prefer to manage larger portfolios, 
from which they can extract larger fees. Clients, on the other hand, are normally 
satisfied when they have returns according to their expectations for the chosen level of 
risk, as long as they are assured that their assets are managed with an adequate level of 
prudence. 
 In the case of poor management by institutions, a number of laws exist that may 
provide penalties in the case of non-prudent behavior by institutions. This means that 
institutions may be liable towards their clients if their investment decisions are not 
deemed “prudent”. Some researchers argue that these laws have created a potential 
agency issue in the relationship between institutions and their clients. Badrinath et al. 
(1989) argue that, as institutional portfolio managers invest client money, they must not 
only be concerned with earning an adequate return on their portfolios, but they also 
must ensure that the securities in the portfolio are such that they will qualify as prudent 
investments. As a result, these researchers argue that institutions involved in managing 
clients’ assets may choose to adjust their investment decisions in order to protect 
themselves from potential liabilities that may arise from their relationship with clients 
(e.g. they may decide to allocate their portfolios to more “prudent” stocks, or stocks that 
can more easily be explained as “prudent” investments, instead of merely using the 
premise of best returns for the chosen level of risk). Institutions are aware that, in the 
case of poor management, they may be subject to legal action against them. 
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 The issues described above, and others that we further describe later, are some of 
the central institutional operating conditions that we analyze on this dissertation. The 
scope of this dissertation is therefore to understand institutional financial decision 
making, focusing on European investment funds. We are primarily concerned with the 
variables that investment funds take into consideration when choosing which stocks to 
hold. In addition to possible “prudent” behaviors from institutions, we analyze possible 
relations with stock characteristics that may be of interest in explaining institutional 
investment decisions. 
 
Main objectives of this investigation 
 The set of criteria that institutions use to select stocks is the issue under study in 
this investigation. We are interested in finding out why European investment funds 
favor certain stocks relative to others. With this goal in mind, we analyze European 
investment fund preferences for stocks from different points of view: first, we search for 
the stock characteristics that are most appealing to institutions (such as company size, 
volatility and others). Second, we try to validate up to which extent institutions exhibit 
“prudent” behavior when managing their portfolios. Third, we try to relate institutional 
preference with other possible variables that might help explain that preference. We test 
for differences across stock market geographic location, funds by investment style, and 
funds when investing on domestic and in foreign markets. 
 Our sample includes European investment funds from 15 countries. With this 
investigation we contribute to fill a gap on research that focuses on European 
institutions, since studies in this area have been mostly limited to the preferences of 
institutional investors in the U.S. market. 
 Note that although we include dedicated sections on the Literature Review chapter 
to explore the “Home Bias” effect and group behaviors such as Herding and trend-
following, we have not performed analyses on these topics. 
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Motivation for this investigation 
 This dissertation serves a number of purposes. First we document the variables 
that European investment funds take into account when managing their portfolios and 
compare and contrast our results with previous studies for other markets. We can verify 
whether European investment funds follow the same set of criteria to select stocks as, 
for instance, U.S. based institutions. 
 Another motivation that has already been referred is related with possible agency-
related issues on the relation between institutions and their clients. By searching for 
evidence of “prudent” behavior by institutions, we allow individual investors for better 
judgment when conceding their money to be managed by institutions. In addition, our 
analysis may be useful for the regulation and supervision of prudent-man laws, since 
our results contribute to provide insight regarding the potential impact that these 
regulations can have on the financial markets. 
 
Main results 
 Overall, we find evidence that European investment funds tend to prefer larger, 
more liquid, high dividend, low volatility stocks that belong to the main stock market 
indices; and that these funds tend to be averse to stocks with higher 12-month 
momentum. These results are generally consistent with theories supporting behaviors of 
“prudence” by institutional investors (see, for instance, Badrinath et al. (1989)) and with 
previous studies that analyze preferences of institutional investors for stocks (see, for 
example, Falkenstein (1996) and Gompers and Metrick (2001)). Our results are also 
robust to “outlier” funds, which are funds that either have a small number of positions 
(less than 15) or own unusually high positions (50% or more outstanding shares of a 
company). 
 We also analyze European investment fund preferences for geographical regions. 
We find weak or inconclusive results that investment funds prefer stocks from the so-
called PIIGS countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain) relative to stocks 
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from other countries; and results are also inconclusive on whether funds prefer stocks 
from Euro-adopted countries relative to stocks from other European countries. 
 Analyzes by geographical regions show that funds in PIIGS countries and funds 
located in non-PIIGS countries have similar preferences; evidence suggests further that 
while funds located in Euro-adopted countries tend to prefer stocks with higher prices, 
funds located in non-Euro countries tend to avoid higher priced stocks. 
 We also find that investment fund preferences were not significantly affected by 
the recent financial crisis in Europe. 
 Analyzing the preferences by fund investment style, our results suggest that 
Growth, Value and other styles do not substantially differ from each other. As for fund 
turnover, we find evidence that funds that have smaller turnover (more inclined to long-
term horizons) exhibit more strictly the preferences towards “prudent” stocks than funds 
with higher turnover. 
 Comparing preferences between domestic and foreign stocks by funds, in general 
we find similar stock characteristics between domestic and foreign investment 
approaches. However, we find evidence that when funds invest domestically they hold 
stocks with low prices, whereas when they invest in foreign markets they exhibit a 
positive preference for stocks with high prices. 
 Finally, our results suggest that the book-to-market ratio variable is not relevant in 
explaining European investment funds’ preferences for stocks. 
 
Comparison with previous studies 
 As referred above, our results are generally consistent with previous studies that 
analyze preferences of institutional investors for stocks. Yet, there are a few important 
distinctions. First, our results are in line with previous studies by Falkenstein (1996) and 
Gompers and Metrick (2001) in that all three studies show institutional preference for 
Size and Liquidity, and aversion to Momentum. In addition, our results and those by 
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Gompers and Metrick show preference for stocks included in the main stock market 
indices (Falkenstein does not include this variable in his study). 
 Our results for Variance, on the other hand, are in line with one of these studies 
and in opposition to the other. We find that this variable is statistically significant and 
its coefficient has a negative sign; this is similar to the results presented by Falkenstein 
but not for those found by Gompers and Metrick. While this variable is found 
statistically significant in this latter study, their evidence suggests investment funds 
prefer high variance stocks. 
 Finally, our results are not consistent with these studies for Price, Age, Dividend 
Yield and Book-to-Market ratio. Price is found statistically significant in our 
investigation and in these studies, but while we find a negative sign on this variable’s 
coefficient, the two previous studies find a positive sign; the same is observed for 
Dividend Yield, except that signs are in opposite directions (our results show a positive 
sign, while Gompers and Metrick find a negative sign; Falkenstein does not use this 
variable in his analysis); and while we find that Age and Book-to-Market ratio are not 
significant in most estimations, the above studies find that these variables are 
statistically significant and positively related with institutional holdings, even though on 
Falkenstein’s study Book-to-Market is only statistically relevant in one of the two 
samples used. 
 As a summary, our results are generally similar to previous studies for the most 
relevant variables (Size, Liquidity, Momentum and presence in the main indices). 
 
The structure of this dissertation 
 In this dissertation, we start by reviewing the main findings highlighted in the 
literature related with institutional behavior and preferences for stock characteristics. 
Chapter 2 covers the following topics: we examine some of the stock characteristics that 
are more interesting to institutions; we review prudence and “prudent” behavior among 
institutions; we analyze institutional activity in terms of group behaviors such as 
herding and positive-feedback trading; we explore some of the latest trends and changes 
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in institutional preference in the most recent decades; we review the topic of home bias, 
a behavior in which investors seem to prefer investing domestically as opposed to in 
foreign markets, ignoring the gains in international diversification; we explore some 
other potential agency-related issues that may drive institutional behavior; and we 
provide an overview of European and U.S. institutional investors. 
 In chapter 3, we first describe the main objectives of the investigation; then, we 
examine the data sources and the methodology; afterwards we provide summary 
statistics of the variables used in our study. 
 In chapter 4 we show and discuss the results of our study. We first present the 
main results for the entire sample of investment funds and later for the sub-analyses that 
were performed. 
 Chapter 5 concludes. 
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2. Literature Review 
 In the U.S., institutions managing assets above a certain size are required to 
report the composition of their portfolios. In the U.S., institutions with $100 million or 
more in assets under management are required to report this information to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on a quarterly basis, in a 13F form. Several 
types of securities need to be reported, including stocks, certain options and warrants, 
and others. 
 In Europe, similar requirements exist. Recent legislation enacted to facilitate the 
development of the financial market has devised the UCITS directives, which stand for 
“Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities”. The UCITS are a 
set of regulations (2001/107/EC and 2001/108/EC) that aim to allow collective 
investment schemes to operate freely throughout the EU on the basis of a single 
authorisation from one member state. UCITS, a name attributed to funds that are 
compliant with these regulations, are now the predominant form of European collective 
investment vehicles and are required to report the composition of the assets under their 
management at least every six months. Non-UCITS funds, which are established under 
domestic law, may have different reporting schemes according to the legislation on the 
countries they operate. Nevertheless, most of the time (if not always), the composition 
of these funds is also required to be reported on a periodic basis. 
 Using the portfolio composition data of institutions, many studies in recent 
decades have analyzed institutional stock ownership preferences and more broadly the 
drivers of investment decision making. We summarize these findings in the next 
sections. 
 
Institutional ownership preferences and investment decision making 
 Some authors explore the preferences of institutions for certain stock 
characteristics. They analyze institutional holdings of stocks according to variables such 
as company size, stock volatility, past returns, book-to-market ratio, liquidity, and 
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others. Their objective is to look for factors inherent to the stocks institutions hold that 
can help in explaining their preferences. 
 Another part of the literature focuses on issues related with prudence and due 
diligence. Studies that belong to this category analyze institutional behavior in light of 
the effects of the Prudent-man Laws, a body of rules that aim to regulate the investment 
behavior of institutions when managing their clients’ money. Among other reasons, 
these studies aim to infer about the usefulness or degree of adequacy of these laws, 
analyzing how effective they are in protecting investors’ interests and in ensuring due 
diligence on the side of managers of these institutions. Also, some of these studies 
compare different institutional investors like banks, insurance companies, pension 
funds, mutual funds and others in order to look for indications of different levels of 
prudence among institutional types.  
 Another important part of the literature focuses on herding and trend behavior 
among institutions. This research aims to study group behaviors by institutions towards 
specific stocks over a period of time. The objective is to take considerations about the 
impact of this behavior on the stock market and to analyze questions related with 
agency costs, irrationality and other arguments for the observed group behaviors. 
 Existing literature also examines the trends of institutional investment 
preferences through time, particularly in recent years. After the observed tendency of 
institutions to move from larger stocks to smaller stocks in recent years (see Bennet et 
al. (2003) and Blume and Keim (2011)), these studies intend to understand what caused 
this change, analyzing for instance whether this effect was caused by a shift in 
institutional preferences or by any other factor. In general, these studies aim to analyze 
whether institutional preferences change over time, to document the reasons in case they 
do, and to discuss the impact of these changes on the stock market. 
 The Literature Review section is organized as follows. In section 2.1, we analyze 
institutional preferences based on stock characteristics. In section 2.2 we explore 
prudence behavior among financial institutions. Section 2.3.1 reviews topics of herding 
and trend following by investors. Section 2.3.2 addresses some of the latest trends in the 
preferences of institutions. In section 2.3.3 we review the literature on home bias 
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behavior by institutional investors. In section 2.3.4 we address topics of potential 
agency issues as drivers of institutional behavior. Finally, in section 2.4 we provide an 
overview of European and U.S. investment organizations, exploring their typical 
profiles towards risk and preferred asset types. 
 
 
2.1. Preferred Stock Characteristics by Institutional Investors 
 The study of institutional preference has led researchers to search for the reasons 
why institutions favor certain stocks relative to others. In an example of this type of 
research, Falkenstein (1996) finds that mutual fund stock holdings increase with share 
price, volatility, liquidity, level of publicized news stories, time since the stock was first 
listed, and firm size. As proxy for volatility, this researcher uses standard deviation and 
variance of returns; and for liquidity he uses transaction volume divided by quantity of 
shares outstanding. Two comments, however, are relevant here: firstly, according to the 
author, the relationship between mutual fund ownership and the variables of share price, 
level of publicized news stories and time since the stock was first listed may best be 
explained, not by a simple positive relation, but rather by an aversion to respectively 
low-priced stocks (under $5), stocks that are very rarely in the news, and stocks that are 
newly listed. The second important comment is for volatility: this variable is indicated 
as having a nonlinear relationship with mutual fund preference, due to the fact that 
standard deviation and variance show respectively a positive and a negative coefficient 
with mutual fund ownership. 
 Falkenstein’s study also includes beta (the “market sensitivity” of an asset to the 
overall market) as a variable on the analysis but finds a mere weak relation between 
beta and mutual fund ownership. This author uses mutual fund equity holdings data on 
NYSE and AMEX for the years 1991 and 1992. 
 Other subsequent studies extend this type of analysis to additional variables. A 
study of Gompers and Metrick (2001) includes past returns as an independent variable 
and finds that institutions primarily show demand for “large, liquid stocks that have low 
past returns”. This study uses firm size, stock turnover and stock price as proxies for 
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liquidity, whereas for past returns it uses the 3-month and 9-month figures. According 
to this study, institutional ownership is positively correlated with all these variables, but 
for Momentum (for both 3-month and 9-month measures) the coefficient is negative 
whenever size is included in the regression. Also, this study includes book-to-Market 
ratio1 and finds that it is significantly related with institutional ownership, most of the 
time positively. In their study, Gompers and Metrick (2001) use NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ common stock holdings data of institutions with assets above $100,000 under 
discretionary management from 1980 to 1996. 
 Finally, other investigations show results similar to the ones above. Bennet et al. 
(2003), for instance, analyze NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ data for March 1983 
through end of 1997 and find that institutional ownership increases with firm size, time 
since the stock was first listed, price, liquidity, and momentum, and has weak or mixed 
relationship with beta and standard deviation. 
 Research on institutional ownership preferences based on European financial 
markets is somewhat scarce. Nevertheless, Khurshed et al. (2011), using a sample of 
UK firms, find that institutional block holders (which are large company shareholders) 
prefer to invest in companies with lower directors’ ownership and higher non-executive 
director presence on the board. These researchers also find evidence of a negative 
relationship between block holder presence and firm size, meaning that block holders 
prefer small stocks relative to large stocks. 
 
 
2.2. Prudence by Institutions and Prudent-man Laws 
 A great part of institutions involved in discretionary asset management operate 
using capital that belongs to clients. Many times, these institutions merely act as agents 
(i.e. they only invest capital provided by others, not their own). In this case, the 
relationship between institutions and their clients is said to be one of fiduciary nature, a 
                                                          
1
 The book-to-market ratio is given by the ratio of a firm’s book value of common equity to its market 
value. 
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contract in which one party operates in representation of another. In this fiduciary 
relationship, operations by institutions are governed by rules and regulations that 
purport to protect clients’ interests. These rules are called “Prudent-man laws” and aim 
to regulate the action of fiduciary agencies so that the money they are entrusted to invest 
is managed in an adequate way (i.e. a proper level of risk is considered in terms of asset 
protection and expected return). In the case of poor management, these rules may hold 
institutions responsible for the liability suffered by clients, possibly enabling these 
clients to claim compensations from fiduciaries. 
 Prudent-man laws, therefore, seem evidently positive for clients, increasing their 
power over institutions in the case of poor management. On the side of institutions, 
however, these laws may introduce risks and costs, and add uncertainty to the business 
decisions these institutions take. Managers of these institutions are aware of these rules, 
and may decide to take them into account when operating client money. Specifically, 
they may see interest in protecting themselves from the potential liability that comes 
from the effect of Prudent-man laws. Badrinath et al. (1989) argue that these managers 
may, for instance, concentrate their stock investment on a fraction of the total universe 
of firms, investing on the ones that provide the best “safety-net” in case of legal action 
moved against them.  In effect, these researchers suggest that a portfolio manager “not 
only considers the usual criteria in making investment choices, but also pay attention to 
whether the investment choices would be considered by others to be those made by a 
well-informed and prudent individual.” (Badrinath et al., 1989, 627) These researchers 
argue that Prudent-man laws, and the effects they might bring, can considerably 
influence institutional decisions as they manage clients’ assets.  
 In the same paper, those authors find evidence that in their view strengthens the 
hypothesis of a “safety-net” biased criterion for selecting stocks by institutions. They 
find a positive relationship between institutional ownership and firm size, past 
performance, liquidity, time since the stock was first listed, and an aversion to stocks 
with high volatility. These results may constitute evidence of prudent behavior from 
institutional managers, by focusing on stocks that are more easily explainable as 
“prudent”. Furthermore, these authors emphasize other reasons why managers might 
feel an incentive to protect themselves from potential liability: during times of inferior 
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portfolio performance, managers face the possibility of client loss, changes in the 
remuneration scheme, or penalties if their actions are deemed to be imprudent, therefore 
have an additional incentive to protect themselves by choosing “prudent” stocks. 
 Another side of this discussion is that different institutions may have different 
levels of prudence. Bank managers, for example, are subject to rigorous prudence 
standards because they invest on behalf of private trust and pension plan clients. As 
referred previously, empirical data suggests that bank managers tilt their portfolios 
towards stocks that they perceive as prudent to protect themselves from potential 
liabilities (Del Guercio, 1996). Also, mutual funds, according to the same study, are 
subject to less restrictive prudence standards, and are not so inclined to protect 
themselves by tilting their portfolios towards more “prudent” stocks. 
 Note that the fact that fund managers may have to respond to clients that are 
unpleased with their management could also lead them to be more risk-averse in terms 
of their bets and strategies. Particularly, when funds do not follow active strategies, 
managers may have an incentive to follow their peers. This would explain the 
phenomenon of Herding behavior as documented by several authors (see below, section 
2.3.1). 
 
 
2.3. Additional Topics in Institutional Preferences 
 
2.3.1. Herding and Trend Following by Institutions 
 Herding and trend-following are two other extensively researched factors that 
influence institutional stock holdings. Herding refers to “any mass movement into 
particular stocks for whatever reason”, as defined by Falkenstein (1996, 112). It 
happens when investors trade the same stock in the same direction over a period of time. 
Trend following, also called positive-feedback trading, is, according to the same author, 
a “specific type of herding by mutual funds that involves a large group of funds chasing 
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stocks that have recently risen in value.” (Falkenstein, 1996, 112) Researchers have 
focused their investigation on these group behaviors in order to better understand their 
impact on the securities markets, for instance in analyzing possible price destabilizing 
behavior by institutional investors. 
 
Motivation factors for herding and positive-feedback trading by institutions 
 Three popular theories are described in the literature as explaining why 
institutions seem to exhibit them. First, a number of authors emphasize reasons related 
with irrational behavior and/or mass psychology. These authors argue that financial 
institutions usually “follow the herd”, investing in certain stocks merely because other 
institutions also did, thus mimicking each other. Reasons advocated for this behavior 
are, for instance, concerns from managers of these institutions about their reputation in 
the labor market, fearing that, if they follow a strategy of their own (without following 
others), they might be perceived as “lone fools” if the market goes against them 
(Sharfstein and Stein, 1990). On the other hand, if they follow what the other 
institutions are doing and the market goes the other way, the damage to their reputation 
will not be as significant because the loss will be shared by all institutions. As a result, 
institutions tend to mimic investment decisions made by their peers, which strengthens 
the argument in favor of the “behavior of the herd”. 
 This view of group behavior is further supported by other authors. Banerjee 
(1992) suggests that these behaviors are rooted in everyday life-learned habits, arguing 
that the common person takes decisions based on what others around her are doing. This 
investigator cites several examples of daily living to support this argument, such as 
deciding what restaurant to go to, what school to attend or in which party to vote, 
decisions that one often takes based on what others did or are doing in the same 
situation. This author suggests that the same principle (denominated as cascade 
behavior) is valid for the process of investment decision making in financial institutions. 
 Supporting the view of group behavior, Welch (1992) provides the example of 
later investors on IPO sales. He asserts that these investors tend to invest on the IPO if 
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earlier investors already did so, and to avoid investing if those did not, thus contributing 
to the “view of the herd”. 
 Other researchers suggest alternative reasons. Falkenstein (1996), for instance, 
emphasizes that mass behaviors on the part of institutions may be observed when stocks 
display certain characteristics. This author finds a strong aversion to low-priced stocks 
(stocks under $5) by mutual funds, due mostly to transaction costs reasons. However, on 
the same study, this researcher finds that, as stock prices rise above $5, mutual funds 
become more inclined to buy them. This tendency to start buying, which this researcher 
considers herding, would of course be unrelated to “irrational” or group mimicking 
behaviors. 
 Finally, other reasons that may cause institutions to herd together is that they 
might receive correlated private information (Hirshleifer et al., 1994), and especially if 
they engage in short-term speculation (Froot et al., 1992). These latter researchers argue 
that short-term speculators base their decisions on the perceptions of what other traders 
are doing, thus have the tendency to herd. 
 
Additional insights into herding and positive-feedback trading 
 Additional insight into herding and positive-feedback trading is given on other 
studies. First, Lakonishok et al. (1992) find that pension fund managers herd relatively 
little in their trades in large stocks, and Grinblatt et al. (1995) find relatively little 
herding by mutual funds, although they find that the majority of mutual funds use 
positive-feedback trading strategies to select stocks. Wermers (1999) finds low levels of 
herding in trades on the average stock by mutual funds, but finds much higher levels 
among small stocks. Also, looking at subgroups of mutual funds, this researcher finds 
higher levels of herding among growth-oriented funds than among income funds, and 
also finds evidence of positive-feedback trading among growth-oriented funds. In 
studies done on European financial markets, Walter and Weber (2006) find evidence of 
herding and positive-feedback trading on German-based mutual funds, and further 
hypothesize that these herding behaviors are to a great extent the result of shared data 
between funds, therefore not the result of group mimicking or “irrational” behavior. On 
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another paper, Wylie (2005) studies a data sample of U.K. equity mutual funds and, in 
accordance to some of the studies referred above, finds evidence of herding especially 
in small stocks. Contrasting to other studies, however, this researcher finds evidence of 
herding also in the largest stocks. Also, curiously, this author finds evidence of 
contrarian behavior on large stocks on the part of U.K. mutual funds. In other words, 
U.K. mutual funds seem to herd out of stocks with positive one-year excess returns 
relative to benchmarks, and to herd into stocks that had low excess one-year returns. 
This contrasts with U.S. mutual funds, which are known to be primarily momentum 
investors, buying on positive returns and selling on negative returns. In studies for less 
mature markets, Lobão and Serra (2002) test for herding behavior in Portugal and find 
strong evidence of herding, about 4 to 5 times the level observed in mature markets like 
the U.K. and the U.S., as described in previous studies. Also, Agudo et al. (2008) test 
for herding in Spain and also find strong levels of herding, considerably higher than for 
levels observed in other studies for the U.K. and the U.S.. 
 In terms of the impact of herding and trend-following by institutions in the stock 
markets, Lakonishok et al. (1992) find that pension fund herding on stock market prices 
has only a small impact. On a contrary view, Nofsinger and Sias (1999) document a 
strong relationship between annual changes in institutional ownership and stock returns. 
On another study, Wermers (1999) finds evidence that mutual fund herding speeds the 
price-adjustment process and, therefore, is not destabilizing. Walter and Weber (2006) 
find that herding on German mutual funds seems neither stabilizing nor destabilizing on 
stock prices, and similar conclusions are taken by Wylie (2005), who finds that mutual 
fund herding in the U.K. does not seem to substantially affect future prices. 
 
2.3.2. Latest Trends in Institutional Preferences 
 Studying institutional ownership preference trends is important to investigate the 
possible impact of these changes on the stock markets. Some effects that can be 
originated are in trading activity, volatility, and also on the stability of prices. Also, 
another important reason is to understand certain stock market phenomena, such as the 
so-called small-stock premium. This effect, which is a documented superior 
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performance of small stocks over large stocks even after controlling for risk, and which 
prevailed through several decades (see, for instance, Banz (1981)), has reversed in 
recent years, according to Gompers and Metrick (2001). These researchers argue that 
the observed reversal in the small-stock premium is related with trends in institutional 
ownership. We detail the reasons in the next paragraphs. 
 In a study of recent trends in institutional ownership preference, Bennet et al. 
(2003) analyze US institutional ownership data between 1983 and 1997 and document 
that institutional investors, whose interest has been primarily for larger stocks 
throughout the decades, have in recent years shifted their portfolios towards smaller 
stocks. These researchers conclude that this observed shift was due to changes in the 
preferences of institutional investors, rather than to other factors like changes in the 
relative importance of different investor types. In a subsequent study, Blume and Keim 
(2011) further document increasing smaller firm stock holdings on the part of 
institutions until 2008, and add that this shift in asset allocation is especially visible on 
hedge funds. 
 Such a shift in the preferences of institutions is historically uncommon, and 
naturally raises the question of what could be causing it. One reason, as suggested by 
Bennet et al. (2003), is that a temporal decline in transaction costs could have motivated 
an increased interest in smaller firms. But perhaps a better reason, also suggested by 
these researchers, is related with the institutional growth that is documented by several 
researchers already mentioned in this document (see, for instance, Friedman (1996), 
Blume and Keim (2011) and Gompers and Metrick (2001)). This growth was, according 
to Bennet et al., focused on large stocks, causing an increase in prices of these stocks 
(assuming imperfect elasticity). As prices of large stocks rose, these researchers suggest, 
this may have caused institutions to look for better opportunities, which in this case 
could be found among smaller stocks. 
 As a side note, this institutional growth is, according to Gompers and Metrick, 
one of the primary reasons that caused the disappearance of the small-stock premium 
referred earlier. With the rising prices of large stocks, the returns of these stocks 
outperformed the ones for small stocks. To support this hypothesis, these researchers 
find that the common stock market share of institutional investors nearly doubled in 
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U.S. markets between 1980 and 1996, representing a sharp institutional growth over this 
time frame. According to these authors, this was a gradual but steady shift that took 
place over this time frame. 
 
2.3.3. Home Bias by Institutions 
 The extent to which investors balance their portfolios between domestic and 
foreign equities (and securities in general) has been subject of considerable academic 
debate in recent decades. Researchers have searched for the causes of the so-called 
“Home Bias”, a phenomenon in which investors tend to invest domestically rather than 
in foreign markets. This is a puzzling result given that investing in foreign securities 
provides potential gains in diversification (see, for instance, Grubel (1968), Levy and 
Sarnat (1970), Solnik (1974) and more recently Grauer and Hakasson (1987), French 
and Poterba (1991) and Santis and Gerard (1997)). Thus, the persistence of the “Home 
Bias” effect even when potential gains by foreign investment exist implies that other 
factors offset these gains, from a fund manager’s viewpoint.  
 Several hypotheses have been considered by researchers to try to explain the 
home bias phenomenon. One first hypothesis is the cost associated with cross-border 
investing, such as taxes and transaction cost barriers (Black (1974) and Stulz (1981)). 
According to this hypothesis, these costs induce a domestic bias on investors because 
the net return on foreign portfolios is less than on domestic portfolios. However, it is 
well known that direct barriers to foreign transactions in the major world markets have 
been drastically reduced since the late 1970’s but the home bias effect persisted in the 
years thereafter (French and Poterba, (1991)). Also, Ahearne et al. (2004) analyze a data 
sample of 1997 and demonstrate that the effects of direct barrier to international 
investment, when statistically relevant, are not economically meaningful. On the other 
hand, French and Poterba assert that different transaction costs between countries 
cannot account for the home bias effect, arguing that if it was the case that these costs 
induced domestic bias, this would incline all investors towards the countries with 
highest liquidity, not towards their respective domestic market, which of course is not 
observed in actual portfolios. 
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 A second possible reason described by the literature is information asymmetry 
between countries. According to this hypothesis, the poor quality and low credibility of 
financial reports in many countries may cast doubts in foreign investors and therefore 
cause them to prefer investing domestically. In support of this hypothesis, Ahearne et al. 
(2004) analyze U.S. investor behavior and find that the home bias effect is significantly 
less for foreign companies listed on North American exchanges than for companies not 
listed on those exchanges. These researchers find that U.S. investors show greater 
interest in allocating their portfolios to those companies listed on U.S. exchanges, and 
hypothesize that this is due to the more stringent U.S. financial reporting standards and 
regulations. Moreover, additional studies provide evidence that information asymmetry 
can indeed cause home bias. Kang and Stulz (1997) analyze foreign investor behavior in 
Japan and find that foreign investors tend to concentrate on shares of the largest 
companies and companies with good accounting performance, as opposed to companies 
with higher expected returns; and Coval and Moskowitz (1999) find that even in 
domestic markets investors tend to allocate their portfolios to companies spatially closer 
to them, as opposed to more distant ones. 
 A third possibility for the home bias effect is related with investor behavior. 
French and Poterba (1991) consider that different return expectations among groups of 
investors could account for the existence of the home bias effect. These researchers 
hypothesize that the domestic bias could be caused by investors in separate countries 
expecting better returns on their domestic market than on foreign markets. Supporting 
their argument on the fact that high volatility makes it difficult to estimate ex-ante 
returns, and therefore make the job of choosing where to invest harder, these researchers 
conjecture that investors in different countries could be following their own 
idiosyncratic rules for investment which would lead them to expect better returns on 
their domestic market. Also, these researchers point out that different perception of risk 
between countries could account for the home bias effect. According to these 
researchers, investors tend to invest in what they know, and investing in foreign markets 
has the potential disadvantage of being less known to investors. 
 A fourth hypothesis suggested by the literature is related with deviations from 
purchasing power parity (PPP) between countries. With inflation risk and potential 
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deviations from PPP, investors may be induced to incorporate in their portfolios a 
component to hedge different inflation risk (Adler and Dumas, 1983). Thus, the home 
bias effect could be explained if domestic equities provide a hedge against this risk. 
However, Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) demonstrate that the magnitude of these PPP 
deviations, combined with plausible estimations for deadweight costs, is insufficient to 
explain the existing domestic bias unless investors have very low levels of risk aversion. 
Therefore, inflation risk hedging is not likely to be the real cause of the home bias 
effect. 
 Finally, other authors suggest the level of development and familiarity as drivers 
for domestic and foreign biases. Chan et al. (2005) find that as countries become more 
developed or less remote from the rest of the world, deadweight costs for foreign 
investment are reduced, resulting in smaller domestic and foreign biases. This is 
measured by a country’s market capitalization, market development indicators, 
transaction costs and native language. These authors further find that factors such as 
economic development, capital controls, and withholding taxes also impact domestic 
and foreign biases, although to a smaller extent. 
 
2.3.4. Other Motivators for Institutional Preference 
 Competition between peers can also drive institutional behavior. Alves and 
Mendes (2010) show that mutual funds tend to overweight stocks issued by their parent 
company and underweight those of competitors. These authors further find that funds 
especially buy stock of their parent company when there is widespread selling, and 
continue to hold those stocks during low performance periods. In addition, these 
researchers find evidence that this potential agency issue is costly to funds, since the 
stock of their parent company underperforms the stock of competitors after funds have 
acquired their parent company’s stock. 
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2.4. Overview of European and U.S. Investment Funds 
 According to EFAMA (EFAMA, International Statistical Release Q1 2012), 
investment funds worldwide totaled 20.9 trillion euros at end of Q1 2012. U.S. funds 
alone represented 10.2 trillion, close to half of the total in terms of domiciled assets. 
Europe as a whole represented almost 6.0 trillion, or 29%. Other regions included Brazil 
(1.2 trillion, 6%), Australia (1.1 trillion, 5%), Japan (762 billion, 4%) and Canada (746 
billion, 4%). 
 We can take several conclusions by examining this information closer. Table 1 
shows an overview of U.S. and European investment fund industry at end of Q1 2012, 
based on assets domiciled or legally owned by country or region, as reported by 
EFAMA. For each region, the total assets are displayed (in billions of euros), as well as 
the total number of mutual funds, and the relative asset allocation between asset types, 
including equity, bonds, and others. 
 
Table 1 - Selected figures for the Investment Fund Industry in Major Regions 
The second column represents the total domiciled or legally owned assets by country or region 
(in billions of euros), the third column the number of mutual funds, and the columns to the right 
the relative asset allocation. As reported by EFAMA, funds of funds are not included, except for 
France, Germany, Italy, and Luxembourg. Figures refer to the end of the first quarter of 2012. 
Source: European Fund and Asset Management Association (EFAMA), International Statistical 
Release Q1 2012. 
      Asset Allocation (in %) 
Country / 
Region 
Total 
Assets 
Number of 
Mutual Funds Equity Bond 
Money 
Market 
Balanced / 
Mixed Other 
World 19,159 73,343 41% 25% 18% 12% 4% 
USA 9,327 7,707 47% 25% 21% 7% 0% 
Europe 5,904 35,658 34% 27% 18% 16% 5% 
UK 676 1,928 59% 21% 1% 9% 10% 
Luxembourg 1,864 9,452 31% 32% 15% 16% 6% 
France 1,132 7,701 26% 18% 33% 22% 1% 
Germany 239 2,051 48% 23% 2% 21% 6% 
Italy 140 645 14% 37% 18% 30% 0% 
 
 The most striking conclusion we can draw from Table 1 is related with asset 
allocation policy. A total of 47% of U.S. assets were allocated to equities in Q1 2012, 
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whereas European funds allocated only 34% of their assets to these securities. This 
suggests that European investors are considerably less inclined to allocate their 
portfolios to equities than their U.S. counterparts (Bams and Otten (2002) reach the 
same conclusions based on 1998 data). Also, there seems to be significant heterogeneity 
in terms of portfolio allocation profiles between European countries.  For instance, UK 
and Germany had respectively 59% and 48% of their assets concentrated in equities at 
end of Q1 2012, whereas Luxembourg, France and Italy had 31%, 26% and 14%. The 
figure of 48% for Germany might seem unexpectedly high. The cause could be related 
with local factors, considering the relatively small size in Germany’s total assets (€239 
billion). 
 Another interesting conclusion we can take from Table 1 is that the number of 
European funds largely exceeds that of U.S. funds. By Q1 2012, whereas U.S. investors 
held assets on a total of 7707 funds, European counterparts invested in almost 36000 
funds, more than four times the number for U.S. investors. Luxembourg and France 
alone had more funds than U.S. investors. 
 
Portfolio allocation profiles by European institutions 
 Table 2 contains Assets under Management figures for European investment 
funds. These figures are reported by EFAMA on its Asset Management report 2012 and 
now refer to end of 2010, since values for 2012 (and 2011) are not yet available. Note 
that the difference between Table 1 and Table 2 is that Table 1 refers to assets domiciled 
or legally owned by country, whereas Table 2 refers to managed assets by country. 
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Table 2 - Selected figures for the Asset Management Industry in Europe 
The second column shows the total assets under management by country or region (in trillions 
of euros), the third column the number of asset management companies, the fourth column the 
average size in assets under management (in billions of euros) and the columns to the right the 
relative asset allocation. Figures refer to end of 2010. Source: European Fund and Asset 
Management Association (EFAMA), Asset Management report 2012 
        Asset Allocation (in %) 
Country / 
Region 
AuM 
(EUR 
trillion) 
Number of asset 
management 
companies 
Average 
AuM (EUR 
billion) 
Equity Bond Money Market Other 
Europe 14.0 3125 4.5 31% 44% 11% 14% 
UK 4.6 186 6.4 46% 36% 9% 10% 
France 2.9 592 4.9 18% 44% 18% 20% 
Germany 1.5 304 4.9 18% 58% 7% 17% 
Italy 0.7 302 2.2 20% 63% 10% 8% 
 
 
 According to Table 2, overall European asset allocation to Equities is shown to 
have been at 31%, lower than values based on domiciliation of assets, as seen on Table 
1. Moreover, EFAMA reports on its Asset Management 2012 Report that European 
asset allocation to equities is highly influenced by the United Kingdom (which allocated 
46% of its assets to equities at end of 2010). The UK, representing about one third of 
total assets under management in Europe in 2010, has, according to the same report, a 
“long established culture of equity investing”, which may explain the strong allocation 
of assets under management to stocks. If we excluded the UK, the total European 
percentage invested in equity and bonds would change to respectively 19% and 51%. 
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3. Empirical Study 
 
3.1. Research Objectives and Issues Analyzed 
 
 The primary goal of this investigation is exploratory: we aim at finding out 
which variables European investment funds take more into account when managing 
their portfolios. We analyze equity Institutional Ownership from different points of 
view. First, we relate this variable with several stock characteristics such as Size, 
Liquidity, Dividend Yield, and others. Our objective is to better understand which stock 
characteristics are most important in explaining investment fund preferences for stocks, 
as well as to take conclusions in terms of possible “prudent” behavior by investment 
funds. 
 In addition to these analyses, we investigate institutional preference by several 
sub-groups of funds. Our goal is to find out whether other variables are important in 
explaining fund preferences. We analyze for patterns by regions, in order to find out (a) 
whether certain countries are favored compared to others and (b) whether funds across 
countries exhibit different preferences; we compare fund preferences across Investment 
Styles, to better understand whether funds with different investment philosophies 
demonstrate different preferences (e.g. Growth versus Value funds); and we compare 
investment fund preferred characteristics when funds invest in their respective domestic 
market with those selected when investing in foreign markets. We also try to understand 
whether institutional preference for stocks was in any way influenced by the recent 
financial crisis. 
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3.2. Data 
 
 The data sample used was generated from two separate databases. European 
fund composition data was extracted from Thomson Reuters’ One Banker – Ownership 
module database. Stock level data was extracted from Thomson Reuters’ Datastream 
and Thomson Reuters’ Datastream Worldscope databases. From Thomson Reuters’ One 
Banker database, we used the fund composition information from a total of 15 different 
European countries (listed later on this section). The data from a total of 984 funds was 
available for the time frame between 1997 and 2011, from which we used Quarter 1 
data from 2008 and 2011. We did so for simplicity reasons in terms of database usage. 
Note that the choice of using only 15 of the total number of countries in Europe was due 
to database constraints (no more data was available). 
 From Thomson Reuters’ Datastream / Datastream Worldscope database, we used 
the stock ownership information for the same 15 countries, which totaled 5758 different 
common stocks. Thomson Reuters’ Datastream Worldscope is a module within 
Thomson Reuters’ Datastream database that contains information relative to the 
financial accounts of listed companies. 
 
Considerations taken with respect to the data samples 
 We use data in a cross-sectional format and consider all funds and all stocks that 
were active at the time corresponding to the analysis. Our sample is therefore free of 
survivorship bias. In terms of data utilization technique, we use the Sedol code as a 
unique company identifier both on the Thomson Reuters’ One Banker and on the 
Thomson Reuters Datastream/Datastream Worldscope databases; therefore we were 
able to find a one-to-one relationship between the two databases. The Sedol code, which 
stands for “Stock Exchange Daily Official List”, is an alphanumeric code assigned to 
each stock by the London Stock Exchange. 
 As we will see on the Methodology section, our model uses one entry per stock 
in our data samples. To cover for companies that have more than one stock (i.e. stocks 
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listed on different exchanges or stocks with primary, secondary and subsequent issues), 
we use whole company data that is available from Thomson Reuters’ Datastream 
Worldscope database. Examples of whole-company data that is available in the database 
are a company’s total market capitalization, the number of shares outstanding, and the 
company’s share price. Note that on the side of Thomson Reuters’ One Banker database 
this issue does not apply since the information is already presented on a whole-company 
level basis. 
 
Filters used to generate the data sample 
 A number of conditions were taken into account in the generation of the samples 
used on these analyses, which we now detail. As a starting point, only common stocks 
were considered. Depositary Receipts, including American, Global and Non-Voting 
receipts were excluded. In addition, Exchange-Traded Funds, Closed-End Funds, 
Investment Trusts and “Bonus Rights” issues were also excluded. 
 In terms of geographical region, we limited our analyses to stocks domiciled in 
the 15 countries analyzed: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom. Note that we were restricted to those 15 countries due to data source 
constraints. Also, for better results on these analyses we limited our samples to the 
stocks traded on the stock exchanges of those countries. 
 Since it was a chief requirement to have one Sedol code per company, we 
restrained our data sample to stocks uniquely identified by one Sedol code. A total of 8 
stocks (roughly 0.2% of the data sample), which had multiple Sedols, were excluded 
due to this reason. 
 On the side of Thomson Reuters’ One Banker database, several other 
considerations were taken. As a starting point, only funds with active management were 
considered. Also, we imposed a minimum of $500,000 in assets under management, 
counting at the time of the last filing date by June 2011. Finally, we had to discard a 
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total of 132 entries (roughly 0.1% in percentage of data entries) due to corrections on 
the Sedol code format.  
 
 
3.3. Methodology 
 
 
3.3.1. Empirical Specification 
 
 We use a censored model to analyze institutional ownership by stock 
characteristics as given by the following equation: 
y =	



0	 if	y
∗ ≤ 0	y∗ =	 +	 +  +⋯+  + 	 if	0 < y
∗ ≤ 100	100 if	100 < y∗
 
where y represents the main variable under study (institutional ownership), y∗ 
represents the latent variable under study, and the explanatory variables  represent the 
stock characteristics: price, size, volume percentage, and the remaining variables. 
 The fund composition data reported on Thomson Reuters’ One Banker database 
contains only long positions. In other words, no fund reported any short position in the 
whole spectrum of data on the database. However, a great part of stocks were found to 
have zero ownership by institutions (more than 40% of available stocks, as we will see 
on section 3.3.3). This high percentage of stocks not owned by any institution needs to 
be taken into account in the choice of the model. Ordinary Least Squares model 
estimates would likely be biased and inconsistent due to the high impact of these stocks. 
Therefore, we use a censored model since this potential drawback is avoided with this 
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type of specification. We decided to use the standard Tobit model (Tobin, 1958) left 
censored on 0 and right censored on 100.  
 
Heteroscedasticity 
 Previous studies2 have reported heteroscedasticity, or the existence of sub-
populations with different variances on the data samples analyzed, in their analyses. We 
have also found evidence of heteroscedasticity on the data samples used in our analysis 
(as can be observed in Appendix I).  The existence of heteroscedasticity in these 
samples is somewhat expectable, given the large sample of data (several thousands of 
stocks, as previously stated) and the wide spectrum of values that some of the stock 
characteristics under analysis can assume (e.g. small and large companies; small and 
high trading volumes; stock prices with much diversity). Given the importance of 
heteroscedasticity on the estimation of regression residuals, our analyses of inference 
use Huber-White standard errors and covariance (Huber, 1967; White, 1980). 
 
 
3.3.2. Model Variables 
 
Dependent variable  
 The variable under analysis is Institutional Ownership (IO), which represents the 
fraction of each stock that is owned by European investment funds, in percentage. To 
compute this variable, on a first step we first sum the percentage ownership by each 
fund for each stock. The result is the total holding percentage of each stock by 
institutional investors. Whenever any stock is not held by any institution, we set its 
ownership percentage to zero. On a second step, to linearize the variable we sum 1 (one) 
to the calculated value and take the natural logarithm of the resulting value. We follow 
                                                          
2Falkenstein (1996) and Gompers and Metrick (2001), to name a few. 
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the same calculation procedure as used by Falkenstein (1996). The dependent variable is 
therefore calculated as follows: 
	(1 + ,), 
 
where , = ∑ "#$%&"	'(&)	*+	,-)	.	$	.&	,."#$%&"	'-"$)/	$	.&	,. ∗ 1000.1  
 
Period of the analyses 
 We use two samples: one for March 2008, which is intended to be a sample with 
small impact from the recent financial crisis in Europe and another one for March 2011. 
The objective is to try to find out whether ownership preferences changed over time and 
in any way were influenced by the financial crisis. 
 Note that the sample of March 2008 could be already contaminated by the 
financial crisis referred above; therefore a sample based on previous results would be 
preferable. However, two factors contributed to our choice of March 2008 as one of the 
used data samples. First, on the side of Thomson Reuters’ One database, the data were 
available only starting in mid-2007 (data for the quarters prior to this period were to a 
large extent unavailable, except by means of considerably increasing complexity on the 
analysis side). Second, data for several relevant independent variables from Thomson 
Reuters’ Datastream Worldscope are stated on an annual basis, which means that 
intermediate (non-end of year) data were not available. Since it was our goal to base the 
measurement of the independent variables on the beginning of the data samples, we 
needed to use data samples at the beginning of the year (i.e. the first quarter, therefore 
March samples). The first March sample available was for the year 2008, therefore this 
was the one that we used. 
 In terms of the impact of this limitation, unreported results from our side indicate 
that the regression estimates using the same independent variables data as used on our 
regressions for 2008-Q1 data (i.e. end of year 2007) and dependent variables in 
December 2007 or March 2008 are very similar (all the coefficients have the same signs 
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and are of the same magnitude; statistical relevance is similar for all coefficients). 
Therefore, we believe that the impact of this limitation is trivial. 
 
Explanatory variables 
 We use a number of explanatory variables that correspond to the stock 
characteristics of the stocks in our samples. The list of variables considered is found 
below. All variables are measured right before the beginning of the time interval 
considered for each data sample (on December 31st, 2007 for sample 2008-Q1 and on 
December 31st, 2011 for sample 2011-Q1). 
a) PRICE: Price of the stock, expressed in Euros. For securities traded in other 
currencies, their price is converted at the close price of the respective exchange 
rate on the corresponding date. 
b) SIZE: Market Capitalization, also expressed in Euros, if necessary converted 
using the same procedure. 
c) LIQUIDITY: As proxy for liquidity we use turnover, i.e., the transaction volume 
percentage, calculated by the number of traded stocks during the last month 
prior to the beginning of the data sample divided by the number of shares 
outstanding at the beginning of the data sample. For example: for the 2008-Q1 
data sample, this variable is the number of traded stocks during December 2007 
divided by the number of shares outstanding on December 31st, 2007. 
d) AGE: number of months since the stock was first time listed. In case more than 
one share type exists for a company, or if the company has stocks issued in more 
than one exchange, we use the age of the domestic or home shares. 
e) 12-month MOMENTUM: 12-month return, including dividends paid, expressed 
in percentage.  
f) DIVIDEND YIELD: Dividend distributed on the same year as the data sample, 
expressed in percentage of market price at the beginning of the quarter under 
analysis. 
g) BTM (Book-to-Market ratio): the ratio of a firm’s book value of common equity 
to its market capitalization. 
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h) VARIANCE: the variance of the monthly returns for the 24-60 months prior to 
the beginning of the quarter under study, depending on availability. This field is 
left empty for stocks with fewer than 24 months of past data (i.e. those 
observations are not used). 
i) DUMMY_STOXX600 (STOXX600 dummy): dummy variable that is equal to 1 if 
the stock belonged to the EURO STOXX 600 index at the beginning of the 
quarter under analysis, or equal to 0 (zero) otherwise. 
j) DUMMY_LOCAL_CTY (Main local indices dummy): dummy variable that is 
equal to 1 if the stock belonged to at least one of the main indices from the 
countries analyzed at the beginning of the quarter under analysis, or equal to 0 
(zero) otherwise. The list of indices considered are as follows: ATX for Austria, 
BEL20 for Belgium, OMX Copenhagen 20 for Denmark, OMX Helsinki 25 for 
Finland, CAC 40 for France, DAX for Germany, Athex 20 for Greece, ISEQ 20 
for Ireland, FTSE MIB for Italy, LuxX for Luxembourg, AEX index for The 
Netherlands, PSI-20 for Portugal, IBEX 35 for Spain, OMX Stockholm 30 for 
Sweden, FTSE 100 for the United Kingdom. 
 
Additional comments 
 Seeking to obtain more robust results, we tried several variable transformations 
in our attempts to choose the most adequate model. After some analysis, we decided to 
use the same principle as Falkenstein (1996) and linearize the variables by taking the 
natural logarithm on most of them, including the dependent variable. For explanatory 
variables, in some cases we use the natural logarithm of the variable plus one, to start in 
zero and to reduce the level of distortion created by this procedure (i.e. in fractional 
numbers between zero and one). The exact metric by which each explanatory variable is 
calculated is as follows: LOG(Variable + 1) for PRICE, LIQUIDITY, DIVIDEND 
YIELD and VARIANCE; LOG(Variable) for SIZE and AGE; and the variables not 
expressed in logarithms for 12-month MOMENTUM, BTM and the dummy variables for 
presence in indices. 
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3.3.3. Overview of European Investment Funds and Equity 
Holdings 
 
 The equity composition of a total of 984 funds is analyzed on the present 
investigation, which invest in roughly 4900 to 5700 stocks in 15 different European 
countries in the two data points of time analyzed. We now include a brief overview of 
the analyzed data samples. The information presented in this section may allow for a 
better understanding of the results reported on chapter 4. 
 
Investment Fund Summary Statistics 
 Table 3 contains the summary statistics of investment funds for the sample under 
analysis, as reported on Thomson Reuters’ One Database – Ownership module. Panel A 
contains values for the first quarter of 2008 and panel B for the first quarter of 2011. 
Only equities are reported, in addition to the conditions discussed previously on section 
3.2. As shown on Table 3, great diversity exists across countries in terms of number and 
size of investment funds. The United Kingdom alone is home to more than one third of 
investment funds included in the two data samples analyzed. In second place in terms of 
the number of funds, Germany has close to one hundred funds, and other countries all 
are considerably under one hundred funds each. Also, the United Kingdom represents 
more than half of investment fund size in our samples. UK based funds, managing about 
€312 billion in equities in Q1 2008, represent about 57% in overall managed assets in 
that quarter and around 60% in Q1 2011. The results of our studies are, therefore, highly 
influenced by the UK. The mean and median values for fund sizes for each country help 
cement the idea of contrast between the larger and the smaller countries. Funds 
domiciled in the UK, Germany, France and Sweden average between €500 and €900 
million in size, whereas funds located on other countries generally are below €300 
million, with several countries under €200 million. An important factor to motivate this 
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difference could be a strong presence of pension funds, insurance companies and other 
asset management institutions in the countries with the largest funds. 
 As a side note, the figures depicted in Table 3 somewhat differ from the ones 
analyzed previously on section 2.4. These differences could be related with different 
criteria for classifying funds (e.g. classifying funds as “equity” funds can sometimes be 
difficult if they invest a certain amount of their assets in other securities, to name one 
such criterion). 
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Table 3 - Summary Statistics on European Investment Funds 
For each analyzed country we present selected investment fund summary statistics. The second 
column contains the number of funds. Columns 3 to 5 contain the total, mean and median value 
of fund equity holdings. Column 6 contains the total number of different stocks owned by the 
aggregate funds in each country. Column 7 and 8 contain the mean and median number of 
different stocks owned by aggregate investment funds in each country. Columns 9 and 10 
contain the mean and median weight of each owned stock on investment fund portfolios, 
divided by country. Panel A presents the information for the 2008-Q1 sample, and panel B for 
2011-Q1. Values extracted from Thomson Reuters’ One Banker database - ownership module, 
equity assets only. 
Panel A: 2008-Q1 Sample 
Value of fund equity 
holdings (EUR Millions)  
Number of 
stocks owned  
Stock weight on 
fund portfolio 
(%) 
Co
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n
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All 
Countries 933 550,479 559 274  3,326 56 42  0.42 0.06 
UK 339 312,325 885 439   2,554 71 54   0.59 0.10 
Germany 110 65,511 575 366   1,055 61 47   0.17 0.03 
Sweden 56 44,190 789 502   1,293 90 72   0.36 0.10 
Austria 47 3,050 56 38   564 25 21   0.23 0.05 
France 47 47,290 946 400   684 62 46   0.33 0.04 
Spain 40 7,656 187 126   379 37 35   0.41 0.03 
Finland 39 7,167 175 97   534 39 35   0.34 0.07 
Portugal 39 1,825 42 24   258 20 17   0.18 0.03 
Greece 37 2,427 62 28   152 29 29   0.34 0.13 
Denmark 35 8,776 219 168   404 35 32   0.33 0.03 
Belgium 35 11,530 320 195   642 55 53   0.19 0.04 
Netherlands 32 12,427 377 199   417 37 26   0.28 0.03 
Ireland 27 14,599 471 257   490 42 33   0.21 0.05 
Italy 25 7,461 276 236   353 40 38   0.13 0.03 
Luxembourg 25 4,244 163 80   399 30 30   0.42 0.03 
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Panel B: 2011-Q1 Sample 
  
Value of fund equity 
holdings (EUR 
Millions)  
Number of stocks 
owned  
Stock weight on 
fund portfolio 
(%) 
Co
u
n
tr
y 
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All 
Countries 895 454,673 462 153  2695 50 37  0.40 0.05 
UK 335 275,040 779 276 
 
2032 60 46 
 
0.57 0.08 
Germany 102 50,849 446 205 
 
894 55 42 
 
0.16 0.03 
Sweden 54 47,655 851 571 
 
1289 93 59 
 
0.40 0.09 
Austria 44 2,338 43 19 
 
486 25 19 
 
0.13 0.03 
France 39 32,222 644 298 
 
531 55 40 
 
0.27 0.04 
Spain 41 4,209 103 57 
 
345 29 27 
 
0.28 0.03 
Finland 37 4,408 108 63 
 
425 32 33 
 
0.28 0.09 
Portugal 36 823 19 12 
 
179 15 15 
 
0.15 0.03 
Greece 32 1,049 27 10 
 
104 23 24 
 
0.43 0.13 
Denmark 38 6,852 171 124 
 
499 36 29 
 
0.23 0.03 
Belgium 33 8,676 241 134 
 
752 58 42 
 
0.14 0.04 
Netherlands 30 8,243 250 148 
 
379 33 30 
 
0.30 0.03 
Ireland 30 7,045 227 90 
 
492 34 24 
 
0.13 0.03 
Italy 24 3,240 120 86 
 
344 32 27 
 
0.10 0.03 
Luxembourg 20 2,025 78 49 
 
381 28 26 
 
0.43 0.05 
 
 
Institutional Ownership 
 A summary of the main figures of Institutional Ownership on these stocks is 
shown on Table 4, as extracted from Thomson Reuters’ Datastream / Datastream 
Worldscope databases. According to the data samples used, a total of 5752 and 4963 
stocks were listed on the 15 countries under analysis, respectively for quarters 2008-Q1 
and 2011-Q1. On average 43% and 46% of these stocks were not owned by any fund 
included in our sample in these time frames. This means that the total listed stocks 
owned by investment funds were only marginally above half the number of total 
available stocks, which suggests that a great part of European stocks is perhaps not 
explored, or not interesting to invest in, by these funds. The fact that such a high level of 
stocks was not owned by any fund on these time frames adds support to the choice of a 
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censored model as the primary model for usage to analyze the preferences of investment 
funds. On Appendix III we detail summary statistics of stocks not owned by any fund.  
Table 4 – Characterization of the Dependent Variable 
Stock information extracted from Thomson Reuters’ Datastream / Datastream Worldscope. 
Institutional ownership data extracted from Thomson Reuters’ One Banker database – 
ownership module. Figures for stocks listed on the exchanges of the 15 countries analyzed. 
  2008-Q1 sample 2011-Q1 sample 
Number of stocks 5752 4963 
Percentage with IOi = 0 (i.e. stock not 
owned by any investment fund) 43% 46% 
Mean IOi 3.42% 3.36% 
Median IOi 0.09% 0.03% 
Max IOi 90.9% 94.5% 
IOi: institutional ownership for stock i     
 
 Table 5 shows the same figures shown on Table 4, but now by country. Only 
2008-Q1 figures are shown because figures for 2011-Q1 are mostly similar. 
 Unsurprisingly, the largest countries have the majority of listed stocks. The 
United Kingdom alone contains one third of all listed stocks, and the four biggest 
countries contain about 70% of listed stocks in total number. With exception of the 
United Kingdom, the countries with highest numbers of stocks not owned by investment 
funds are the countries with highest number of available stocks. 
 As a side note, the median ownership values for a number of countries is zero 
because more than half of the stocks available for trade on those respective countries is 
not owned by any investment fund. This of course decreases the median value in these 
cases to zero. 
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Table 5 – Characterization of the Dependent Variable by Country 
Figures presented are for stocks listed on the exchanges of the 15 countries analyzed. We only 
display data for sample 2008-Q1 since the data for sample 2011-Q1 is very similar. Stock 
information extracted from Thomson Reuters’ Datastream / Datastream Worldscope, 
institutional ownership data extracted from Thomson Reuters’ One Banker database – 
ownership module. 
  2008-Q1 sample 
Country Number of stocks Percentage with  IOi = 0 
Mean IOi Median IOi Max IOi 
United Kingdom 1902 36% 5.2% 0.9% 50.6% 
Germany 921 60% 1.9% 0.0% 86.0% 
France 850 55% 2.0% 0.0% 77.6% 
Sweden 441 51% 3.7% 0.0% 37.6% 
Italy 300 26% 2.1% 0.9% 20.4% 
Greece 285 50% 1.9% 0.0% 23.2% 
Denmark 204 52% 1.7% 0.0% 25.4% 
Spain 158 25% 2.9% 0.9% 90.9% 
Netherlands 153 28% 4.4% 2.5% 22.6% 
Belgium 149 23% 2.0% 0.7% 14.9% 
Finland 131 15% 5.0% 3.9% 21.2% 
Austria 102 38% 2.4% 1.3% 13.0% 
Ireland 68 6% 3.7% 2.1% 27.7% 
Portugal 55 20% 3.6% 2.1% 21.2% 
Luxembourg 33 18% 2.8% 1.1% 32.2% 
IOi: institutional ownership for stock i 
 
 
Stock Holdings summary statistics 
 A summary on the descriptive statistics of the stocks owned by investment funds 
is provided on Table 6. The mean, median, maximum and minimum values for most 
independent variables are displayed. 
 An interesting point to mention about the values on Table 6 is the comparison 
between the values on Panel A and the values on Panel B. As expected, these figures 
appear to reflect the effects of the recent financial crisis in Europe. On one hand, 
average values for Size, Price and Dividend Yield decreased from 2008 to 2011; as for 
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the variance of returns and the transaction volume percentage figures, we observe an 
indication of the increased volatility in the financial markets. 
 For added insight into these figures, we also add this information detailed by 
country for data sample 2008-Q1. We include it on Appendix II to simplify the level of 
detail shown on this section. 
 
Table 6 – Descriptive Statistics for Selected Relevant Independent Variables under 
Study 
Selected figures are taken at the beginning of the quarter under study. Panel A refers to quarter 
2008-Q1 and panel B to quarter 2011-Q1. Return Variance is the variance of returns. Size is 
market capitalization in EUR millions. Liquidity is transaction volume in percentage of shares 
traded on the last month prior to the beginning of the quarter. Price is stock price, in euros. 
Dividend yield is the dividend distributed on the same year as the data sample, expressed in 
percentage of market price at the beginning of the quarter under analysis. Age is the number of 
months since the stock was first listed. 12-month momentum is the one-year returns. BTM is the 
book-to-market ratio of each stock. Data extracted from Thomson Reuters’ Datastream / 
Datastream Worldscope. 
  Panel A: 2008-Q1 sample 
Metric Return Variance 
Size 
(EUR 
Millions) 
Liquidity Price (EUR) 
Div 
Yield 
Age 
(months) 
Momentum 
12m BTM 
Mean 0.06 1,075 4.29 41.6 1.98 137.1 21.5 0.42 
Median 0.01 46 1.24 4.4 0.85 103.4 -10.3 0.58 
Maximum 0.29* 113,218 28.27* 593.3* 11.3* 524.4 157.7* 3.45* 
Minimum 0.00 0.1 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.9 -99.8 -0.17** 
                  
  Panel B: 2011-Q1 sample 
Metric Return Variance 
Size 
(EUR 
Millions) 
Liquidity Price (EUR) 
Div 
Yield 
Age 
(months) 
Momentum 
12m BTM 
Mean 0.16 1,050 4.40 32.0 2.01 168.5 20.1 0.31 
Median 0.02 40 1.26 3.2 0.00 136.9 6.7 0.76 
Maximum 0.39* 107,366 30.66* 425.4* 11.4* 560.9 274.9* 5.88* 
Minimum 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.9 -99.1 -0.17** 
* Replaced by the 99.0% percentile to avoid extreme values 
** Replaced by the 1.0% percentile to avoid extreme values 
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Correlation statistics between variables 
 Table 7 contains the correlation statistics between the independent variables used 
in the regressions. The values were extracted from the 2008-Q1 data sample. The 
statistics for 2011-Q1 sample are omitted since the correlation figures are very similar 
to the ones for 2008-Q1 sample and are available upon request. 
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Table 7 – Correlation Figures between Independent Variables under Study 
From Thomson Reuters’ One Banker – Ownership module and Thomson Reuters’ Datastream / Datastream Worldscope, we take the independent 
variable figures and construct the correlation matrix between these variables for the 2008-Q1 data sample. The definition of each independent variable is 
available on section 3.3.2. The number of observations may vary according to availability. 
  PRICE SIZE LIQUIDITY AGE MOMENTUM DIVYIELD BTM VARIANCE DUMMY_STOXX600 DUMMY_LOCAL_CTY 
PRICE 1.00                   
SIZE 0.55 1.00                 
LIQUIDITY -0.11 0.33 1.00               
AGE 0.34 0.35 0.04 1.00             
MOMENTUM 0.18 0.12 -0.06 0.03 1.00           
DIVYIELD 0.35 0.42 0.07 0.29 0.03 1.00         
BTM 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.05 0.07 1.00       
VARIANCE -0.12 -0.15 -0.02 -0.06 0.00 -0.13 -0.05 1.00     
DUMMY_STOXX600 0.19 0.57 0.44 0.22 0.02 0.24 -0.02 -0.06 1.00   
DUMMY_LOCAL_CTY 0.21 0.57 0.33 0.20 0.04 0.21 -0.03 -0.06 0.70 1.00 
 
 
 João Paulo Pais Vaz Nunes  41 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1. Preferred Stock Characteristics by Investment Funds 
 
 Table 8 shows the regression results for the entire sample of investment funds 
(for all the 15 European countries). Panel A contains the results for 2008-Q1 data 
sample and panel B for 2011-Q1. 
 Our results suggest that institutional ownership increases with SIZE, LIQUIDITY 
(using transaction volume percentage as proxy) and DIVIDEND YIELD, and decreases 
with PRICE, MOMENTUM, and VARIANCE of returns. All these variables except 
VARIANCE are statistically significant for all estimations. Also, surprisingly, the 
dummy variables for presence in the EURO STOXX 600 and in the local main country 
indices have negative coefficients, indicating aversion to stocks present in these indices. 
As we will see later in this section, this occurs because the largest companies that 
belong to indices seem to be negatively discriminated relative to the smaller companies 
in those indices in our results. In reality, controlling for this effect, coefficients on these 
dummy variables become positive, indicating preference for stocks that belong to the 
main stock market indices. 
 Concerning the other independent variables, AGE and BTM are not statistically 
significant in almost all estimations. This means that it is not conclusive whether 
investment funds select high or low AGE or BTM stocks. 
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Table 8 – Regression for the Entire Sample of Investment Funds 
Independent variables were measured at the beginning of each of the analyzed quarters, 
dependent variable at the end. The definition of the dependent and the independent variables is 
available on section 3.3.2. Columns represent separate estimations. We use a Censored (TOBIT) 
model left censored on 0 and right censored on 100. We use Huber-White-corrected standard 
errors to compensate for Heteroscedasticity (Huber (1967), White (1980)) (t-Statistics in 
parentheses). 
  2008-Q1 data sample   2011-Q1 data sample 
Intercept -8.24* -8.21* -8.46*   -10.63* -10.54* -10.45* 
  (-24.99) (-24.40) (-27.54)   (-34.01) (-34.43) (-35.97) 
PRICE -0.26* -0.26* -0.26*   -0.29* -0.29* -0.29* 
  (-10.84) (-10.91) (-11.21)   (-11.94) (-11.88) (-11.44) 
SIZE 0.48* 0.48* 0.48*   0.58* 0.58* 0.59* 
  (26.94) (25.99) (27.13)   (33.75) (33.86) (34.80) 
LIQUIDITY 0.33* 0.28* 0.33*   0.33* 0.29* 0.33* 
  (9.93) (9.07) (9.96)   (9.49) (8.85) (9.82) 
AGE -0.06 -0.07*     0.07 0.06   
  (-1.84) (-2.10)     (1.95) (1.65)   
MOMENTUM -0.28* -0.27* -0.28*   -0.11* -0.12* -0.11* 
  (-4.24) (-4.12) (-4.26)   (-3.57) (-3.66) (-3.57) 
DIVYIELD 0.26* 0.25* 0.25*   0.18* 0.17* 0.19* 
  (7.10) (6.83) (6.90)   (5.04) (4.63) (5.15) 
BTM 0.14 0.12     -0.38 -0.32   
  (0.54) (0.48)     (-1.32) (-1.13)   
VARIANCE -4.29* -4.16* -4.29*   -2.37* -2.20* -2.28 
  (-3.29) (-3.28) (-3.32)   (-2.05) (-2.00) (-1.75) 
DUMMY_STOXX600 -0.79*   -0.80*   -0.96*   -0.94* 
  (-9.59)   (-9.76)   (-11.52)   (-11.20) 
DUMMY_LOCAL_CTY   -0.75*       -0.97*   
    (-9.09)       (-11.87)   
*Significant at the 5% level               
 
 
Discussion 
 As we further detail in section 4.2, the results on Table 8 suggest behaviors of 
“prudence” by investment funds. Supporting this argument is the observed positive 
preference for SIZE, LIQUIDITY, DIVIDEND YIELD, and also for the dummy variables 
that capture the presence in the main stock market indices. Also supporting this 
argument is the observed avoidance to stocks with higher VARIANCE of returns. 
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 These results are generally in line with previous studies, at least for the most 
relevant variables. Falkenstein (1996) and Gompers and Metrick (2001) find that 
institutional preferences increase with Size and Liquidity, and also with presence in the 
main indices (this last variable only for Gompers and Metrick’s study, since 
Falkenstein’s study does not include it). Nevertheless, the results for the other variables 
described above are not always in line with the results found by these authors. Although 
we find a positive relation between institutional stock preferences and DIVIDEND 
YIELD, Gompers and Metrick find a negative, statistically significant relation with 
institutional preference (Falkenstein does not use the variable Dividend Yield). As for 
VARIANCE, our results are in line with Falkenstein’s study but contrary to that of 
Gompers and Metrick, in that this variable is found positively related with investment 
fund preferences in the study of these authors. 
 Another result is the negative sign on MOMENTUM suggesting that investment 
funds are averse to stocks with recent higher returns. In other words, as stock returns 
increase, investment funds tend to lose their interest in buying those stocks, and as stock 
returns decrease, investment funds tend to be more inclined to buy them. This suggests 
that investment funds exhibit contrarian behavior, buying on low returns and not buying 
(or selling) on high returns. Falkenstein (1996) and Gompers and Metrick (2001) find 
similar results (although for the former researcher MOMENTUM is only found 
statistically significant for one of the two samples used). 
 Our results for AGE are somewhat surprising. Considering evidence of 
“prudent” behavior by investment funds, we would expect to find a statistically relevant, 
positive relation with institutional holdings, indicating that investment funds would 
prefer older, more mature companies. However, this variable was found not significant 
on almost all our estimations. Therefore, we find inconclusive results concerning 
institutional preferences regarding the age of stocks. These results are not similar to 
previous studies. Falkenstein (1996) and Gompers and Metrick (2001) find that this 
variable is statistically relevant and positively related with institutional ownership. 
 Our results further indicate that BTM is not statistically significant across all 
estimations; therefore it is inconclusive whether investment funds prefer or are averse to 
stocks with high or low BTM. This result is contrary to previous studies: Falkenstein 
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(1996) and Gompers and Metrick (2001) find a positive relation between this variable 
and institutional holdings. 
 Finally, we find that investment funds avoid stocks with high prices. Evidence 
provided in the studies referred above shows the opposite: in both studies, Price is found 
statistically significant but with a positive relation with institutional ownership. 
 
 
Aversion to stocks that belong to stock market indices 
 The negative coefficients on the dummy variables for presence on the main stock 
market indices suggest that European investment funds demonstrate aversion to stocks 
that belong to these indices, even after the other characteristics have been controlled for. 
This is contrary to our expectations, as one would expect funds to favor stocks that 
belong to the main indices relative to others. Seeking to further understand this 
phenomenon, we added additional variables to capture the SIZE effect within the stocks 
that belong to indices. We include one variable for the EURO STOXX 600 dummy and 
another one for the local stock market indices. 
 Table 9 shows the results of this analysis. These new variables are called 
SIZE*DUMMY_STOXX600 for the EURO STOXX 600 index and 
SIZE*DUMMY_LOCAL_CTY for the country local indices. When these cross 
variables are added to the regressions, their coefficient is negative and the coefficients 
on the corresponding index dummy variables become positive. In other words, when we 
control for influence of SIZE on the dummy variables for presence in indices, we find 
that investment funds do prefer to invest in stocks that belong to those indices. As long 
as we control for this factor, the SIZE influence on the dummy variables is no longer 
visible. 
 Note that since the results obtained are very similar between the EURO STOXX 
600 dummy and the local country indices dummy we will use only the EURO STOXX 
600 dummy from now on in subsequent analyses. 
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Table 9 – Regression controlling for Size on Index Dummy Variables 
From the results obtained for the entire samples of investment funds, we add two additional 
variables to control for Size in the index dummy variables. Independent variables were 
measured at the beginning of each of the analyzed quarters, dependent variable at the end. The 
definition of the dependent and the independent variables is available on section 3.3.2. Columns 
represent separate estimations. We use a Censored (TOBIT) model left censored on 0 and right 
censored on 100. We use Huber-White-corrected standard errors to compensate for 
Heteroscedasticity (Huber (1967), White (1980)) (t-Statistics in parentheses). 
  2008-Q1 data sample   2011-Q1 data sample 
Intercept -8.62* -8.63*   -11.23* -11.19* 
  (-25.23) (-24.46)   (-34.83) (-35.26) 
PRICE -0.27* -0.27*   -0.31* -0.31* 
  (-11.17) (-11.29)   (-12.41) (-12.56) 
SIZE 0.50* 0.51*   0.62* 0.62* 
  (26.90) (25.78)   (34.38) (34.59) 
LIQUIDITY 0.31* 0.26*   0.31* 0.27* 
  (9.23) (8.29)   (9.07) (8.10) 
AGE -0.07 -0.07*   0.07* 0.07 
  (-1.89) (-2.01)   (1.97) (1.83) 
MOMENTUM -0.27* -0.27*   -0.12* -0.12* 
  (-4.04) (-4.10)   (-3.70) (-3.74) 
DIVYIELD 0.25* 0.24*   0.17* 0.16* 
  (6.69) (6.66)   (4.71) (4.57) 
BTM 0.10 0.01   -0.40 -0.40 
  (0.37) (0.48)   (-1.39) (-1.37) 
VARIANCE -4.12* -3.95*   -2.20 -2.03 
  (-3.26) (-3.23)   (-1.95) (-1.91) 
DUMMY_STOXX600 7.13*     11.83*   
  (8.37)     (14.49)   
SIZE*DUMMY_STOXX600 -0.35*     -0.57*   
  (-9.35)     (-15.74)   
DUMMY_LOCAL_CTY   6.23*     9.73* 
    (6.65)     (12.48) 
SIZE*DUMMY_LOCAL_CTY   -0.31*     -0.48* 
    (-7.45)     (-13.74) 
*Significant at the 5% level           
 
 
Analysis excluding outliers 
 Descriptive statistics shown on the previous chapter suggest that there are some 
“outlier” funds. We define an “outlier” fund as one that meets at least one of the 
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following two criteria: (a) a fund having less than 15 positions in total in its portfolio, 
and (b) a fund owning at least one position with 50% or more shares outstanding of a 
specific company. With this analysis we examine whether (a) small funds or funds 
highly concentrated or (b) possible isolated cases of sizeable ownership by investment 
funds motivated by final investor’s profile could significantly influence the results we 
report on Table 9. 
 Table 10 shows the results for the estimations excluding the “outlier” funds. For 
the sample 2008-Q1, we excluded 147 funds that had less than 15 positions and we 
excluded a total of 5 funds that owned at least 50% of a company’s shares. For the 
sample 2011-Q1, we excluded 165 funds that had less than 15 positions and 4 funds that 
had positions above 50% of company outstanding shares. 
 From Table 10 we conclude that the results are very similar to the ones found for 
the entire sample of funds3. The coefficients have the same sign as before and are 
statistically significant in all cases. Therefore, we can conclude that the main results are 
not contaminated by “outlier” funds. 
 
 
                                                          
3
 We exclude the dummy variable for inclusion in the local stock market indices DUMMY_LOCAL_CTY 
and its cross variable with SIZE (SIZE*DUMMY_LOCAL_CTY).  Unreported results indicate that the 
results are similar using these variables. 
 João Paulo Pais Vaz Nunes  47 
 
 
Table 10 – Regression Results for entire Sample, Outliers excluded 
Starting from the entire sample of investment funds, we exclude the ones considered “outliers” 
and re-generate the estimations. An outlier is a fund that fulfills at least one of two criteria: (a) 
having less than 15 positions in total in its portfolio, and (b) owning at least one position with 
50% or more shares of a specific company. Independent variables were measured at the 
beginning of each of the analyzed quarters, dependent variable at the end. The definition of the 
dependent and the independent variables is available on section 3.3.2. Columns represent 
separate estimations. We use a Censored (TOBIT) model left censored on 0 and right censored 
on 100. We use Huber-White-corrected standard errors to compensate for Heteroscedasticity 
(Huber (1967), White (1980)) (t-Statistics in parentheses). 
  2008-Q1 data sample 2011-Q1 data sample 
Intercept -8.64* -11.22* 
  (-25.25) (-34.75) 
PRICE -0.27* -0.31* 
  (-11.74) (-12.48) 
SIZE 0.50* 0.62* 
  (26.88) (34.11) 
LIQUIDITY 0.31* 0.32* 
  (9.39) (9.24) 
AGE -0.06 0.08* 
  (-1.68) (2.15) 
MOMENTUM -0.27* -0.12* 
  (-4.08) (-3.65) 
DIVYIELD 0.25* 0.17* 
  (6.69) (4.78) 
BTM 0.09 -0.43 
  (0.34) (-1.47) 
VARIANCE -4.26* -2.27* 
  (-3.27) (-1.96) 
DUMMY_STOXX600 7.19* 11.85* 
  (8.43) (14.54) 
SIZE*DUMMY_STOXX600 -0.36* -0.58* 
  (-9.43) (-15.80) 
*Significant at the 5% level     
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4.2.  Evidence of Prudent Behavior 
 
 The findings in section 4.1 revealed that investment funds analyzed in our study 
prefer investing in larger, more liquid stocks and stocks that belong to indices and that 
pay higher dividends. This statement is generally in line with evidence related with 
investment in “safer” and “more prudent” stocks that we founded in section 2.2. After 
all, larger companies tend to be more mature and more well-known than smaller 
companies, and to have less probability of bankruptcy; higher levels of liquidity mean 
that these stocks are more easily negotiable; and stocks that belong to indices are 
associated with higher levels of reputation, popularity and credibility. All these factors 
help solidify theories of more “prudent” behavior by institutions since they can easily be 
used by institutions to argument in favor of an adequate investment policy, in the case 
of any legal action moved against those institutions. 
 
 
 
4.3. Preferences by Region 
 The results discussed so far allow us to take conclusions about the general 
preferences of European investment funds. We now make additional analyses based on 
subsamples of funds or stocks so as to reveal other patterns of differences across sub-
categories of funds. 
 
PIIGS versus non-PIIGS stocks 
 An interesting analysis to complement the results already obtained is to verify 
whether funds exhibit geographical preferences. In this sub-section we test for 
preference or aversion to the subset of PIIGS countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece 
and Spain). These countries received this designation for public finance imbalances that 
became evident after the recent European financial crisis. In addition to this fact, PIIGS 
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can be distinguished from other European countries because they are located in the 
periphery of Europe. Most of them are southern European countries, while Ireland is 
situated on the northwestern area of Europe, but in any case all are away from the center 
of Europe. With this analysis we intend to investigate whether these factors influence 
the financial decisions of investment funds. In addition, another possibility for analysis 
is to investigate whether the recent financial crisis that affected Europe in any way 
changed investment funds preferences for stocks on these countries. We can perform 
this analysis by comparing the preferences between the 2008-Q1 and 2011-Q1 data 
samples. 
 Table 11 displays the results of this analysis. Starting with the base variables (i.e. 
the variables already covered), we add two additional ones. The first one, that we’ve 
called PIIGS, is a dummy variable that assumes the value of 1 for stocks domiciled in 
the PIIGS countries and 0 otherwise. The second variable is the product between that 
variable and the variable SIZE. The objective of the second variable is to control for 
SIZE on the stocks domiciled on the PIIGS countries. As seen previously on section 4.1 
for the dummy variables for presence in the main indices, not controlling for SIZE could 
lead to erroneous conclusions. 
 The results are somewhat mixed. After controlling for SIZE among the stocks 
that are domiciled on the PIIGS countries, the coefficient on the PIIGS variable 
becomes positive. However, this variable is only statistically significant for the 2011-Q1 
data sample with a relatively low coefficient-to-standard error ratio. Therefore, there 
seems to be weak evidence that European investment funds may prefer to allocate their 
portfolios to stocks of PIIGS countries4. 
                                                          
4
 Unreported analyses indicate that these results are similar including the cross variable for the EURO 
STOXX 600 dummy variable (SIZE* DUMMY_STOXX600). 
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Table 11 – Regression by PIIGS or non-PIIGS Stocks 
For each stock we add the dummy variable PIIGS. This variable assumes the value of 1 if the 
stock is located in a PIIGS country and 0 otherwise. Independent variables were measured at the 
beginning of each of the analyzed quarters, dependent variable at the end. The definition of the 
dependent and the independent variables is available on section 3.3.2. Columns represent 
separate estimations. We use a Censored (TOBIT) model left censored on 0 and right censored 
on 100. We use Huber-White-corrected standard errors to compensate for Heteroscedasticity 
(Huber (1967), White (1980)) (t-Statistics in parentheses). 
  2008-Q1   2011-Q1 
Intercept -8.54* -8.68*   -10.79* -11.00* 
  (-25.81) (-25.84)   (-34.51) (-34.62) 
PRICE -0.30* -0.30*   -0.33* -0.33* 
  (-12.34) (-12.35)   (-12.80) (-12.86) 
SIZE 0.51* 0.51*   0.60* 0.61* 
  (28.14) (27.81)   (33.94) (33.81) 
LIQUIDITY 0.34* 0.33*   0.32* 0.33* 
  (10.26) (10.20)   (9.43) (9.57) 
AGE -0.06 -0.06   0.07 0.06 
  (-1.60) (-1.71)   (1.91) (1.69) 
MOMENTUM -0.22* -0.23*   -0.15* -0.15* 
  (-3.42) (-3.52)   (-4.38) (-4.44) 
DIVYIELD 0.25* 0.25*   0.17* 0.18* 
  (6.77) (6.83)   (4.71) (4.94) 
BTM 0.14 0.10   -0.20 -0.20 
  (0.54) (0.50)   (-0.59) (-0.77) 
VARIANCE -4.92* -4.88*   -2.68* -2.65* 
  (-3.43) (-3.41)   (-2.02) (-2.00) 
DUMMY_STOXX600 -0.86* -0.85*   -0.98* -0.97* 
  (-10.77) (-10.50)   (-11.95) (-11.84) 
PIIGS -0.66* 0.58   -0.54* 1.36* 
  (-10.57) (0.97)   (-7.59) (2.42) 
SIZE*PIIGS   -0.06*     -0.10* 
    (-2.16)     (-3.50) 
*Significant at the 5% level 
 
 
EURO versus non-EURO stocks 
 We also test for preference or aversion to stocks of companies in countries that 
belong to the Euro group. Out of the 15 countries considered in our analysis, 12 
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countries have adopted the Euro (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain). The countries that did not 
adopt the Euro are Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom. With this analysis we 
aim to investigate whether the adoption of the single currency has had any effect on 
investment funds preferences. 
 Table 12 displays the results of this analysis. As performed on the PIIGS 
analysis, we include a dummy variable for the countries that adopted the Euro and 
another variable for the product of this variable with variable SIZE. Again, the dummy 
variable takes the value of 1 if the stock is located in a Euro country and a value of zero 
otherwise. 
 The results presented on Table 15 are inconclusive. On one hand, the coefficient 
on the dummy variable is negative and statistically significant whenever it is considered 
alone. However, when we control for SIZE with the cross-variable, the dummy variable 
is not statistically significant, for both data samples5. 
 
                                                          
5
 Unreported analyses  indicate that these results are similar including the cross variable for the EURO 
STOXX 600 dummy variable (SIZE* DUMMY_STOXX600). 
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Table 12 – Regression by EURO or non-EURO Stocks 
We add the dummy variable EURO. This variable assumes the value of 1 if the stock is located 
in a country that belongs to the Euro Group and 0 otherwise. Independent variables were 
measured at the beginning of each of the analyzed quarters, dependent variable at the end. The 
definition of the dependent and the independent variables is available on section 3.3.2. Columns 
represent separate estimations. We use a Censored (TOBIT) model left censored on 0 and right 
censored on 100. We use Huber-White-corrected standard errors to compensate for 
Heteroscedasticity (Huber (1967), White (1980)) (t-Statistics in parentheses). 
  2008-Q1   2011-Q1 
Intercept -8.05* -8.41*   -10.04* -10.21* 
  (-25.07) (-20.82)   (-33.41) (-27.90) 
PRICE -0.15* -0.15*   -0.17* -0.17* 
  (-6.60) (-6.66)   (-7.13) (-7.12) 
SIZE 0.49* 0.51*   0.58* 0.59* 
  (28.22) (22.68)   (34.96) (28.57) 
LIQUIDITY 0.27* 0.27*   0.25* 0.25* 
  (8.40) (8.21)   (7.59) (7.59) 
AGE -0.08* -0.08*   0.04 0.03 
  (-2.26) (-2.35)   (1.04) (1.00) 
MOMENTUM -0.24* -0.25*   -0.17* -0.18* 
  (-3.80) (-3.88)   (-4.94) (-4.99) 
DIVYIELD 0.22* 0.22*   0.14* 0.15* 
  (6.25) (6.17)   (4.16) (4.18) 
BTM 0.15 0.16   -0.14 -0.14 
  (0.61) (0.62)   (-0.47) (-0.46) 
VARIANCE -4.11* -4.03*   -2.46* -2.41* 
  (-3.06) (-3.05)   (-2.03) (-2.01) 
DUMMY_STOXX600 -0.88* -0.88*   -1.02* -1.03* 
  (-11.13) (-11.18)   (-12.93) (-12.97) 
EURO -0.74* -0.10   -0.84* -0.51 
  (-14.01) (-0.23)   (-15.83) (-1.26) 
SIZE*EURO   -0.03     -0.02 
    (-1.60)     (-0.81) 
*Significant at the 5% level 
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PIIGS versus non-PIIGS funds (domiciliation) 
 We also test for different preferences in funds according to their geographic 
domiciliation. Specifically, we analyze whether funds located in PIIGS have different 
preferences compared with funds located in or non-PIIGS countries. 
 Table 13 shows the results. The majority of explanatory variables are still 
statistically significant in all or almost all cases, including SIZE, PRICE, LIQUIDITY, 
MOMENTUM, and the dummy variable for presence on the EURO STOXX600. The 
signs of the coefficients are also generally the same. The main difference is for 
Dividend Yield (statistically significant only for non-PIIGS countries, positive sign). 
Overall the results of this evaluation suggest that there are close to no relevant 
differences between investment fund preferences for PIIGS and non-PIIGS countries 
and also that no relevant changes occurred between the period before the Euro financial 
crisis and the one within the crisis. 
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Table 13 – Regression by PIIGS or non-PIIGS Fund Preferences 
Independent variables were measured at the beginning of each of the analyzed quarters, 
dependent variable at the end. The definition of the dependent and the independent variables is 
available on section 3.3.2. Columns represent separate estimations. We use a Censored (TOBIT) 
model left censored on 0 and right censored on 100. We use Huber-White-corrected standard 
errors to compensate for Heteroscedasticity (Huber (1967), White (1980)) (t-Statistics in 
parentheses). 
  2008-Q1   2011-Q1 
  PIIGS non-PIIGS   PIIGS non-PIIGS 
Intercept -7.06* -8.74*   -6.54* -11.32* 
  (-16.32) (-25.40)   (-17.01) (-34.31) 
PRICE -0.06* -0.26*   -0.09* -0.29* 
  (-2.62) (-10.68)   (-4.35) (-11.54) 
SIZE 0.30* 0.51*   0.31* 0.62* 
  (14.42) (26.70)   (15.78) (33.55) 
LIQUIDITY 0.18* 0.31*   0.02 0.34* 
  (5.06) (9.06)   (0.53) (9.64) 
AGE 0.00 -0.07*   -0.02 0.07 
  (0.00) (-2.07)   (-0.74) (1.92) 
MOMENTUM 0.09* -0.34*   -0.59* -0.08* 
  (2.15) (-4.95)   (-7.78) (-2.66) 
DIVYIELD 0.07 0.23*   -0.03 0.17* 
  (1.47) (6.11)   (-0.74) (4.77) 
BTM -0.04 0.12   0.43* -0.69* 
  (-0.10) (0.46)   (3.12) (-2.32) 
VARIANCE -7.27* -3.54*   -6.67* -1.97* 
  (-2.02) (-3.03)   (-3.49) (-1.97) 
DUMMY_STOXX600 2.47* 7.13*   5.07* 11.75* 
  (3.78) (8.24)   (8.71) (14.45) 
SIZE*DUMMY_STOXX600 -0.12* -0.35*   -0.23* -0.57* 
  (-4.02) (-9.13)   (-8.64) (-15.67) 
*Significant at the 5% level 
 
 
EURO versus non-EURO Funds 
 We now test for differences in preferences between investment funds located in 
Euro-countries and those in other European countries (Denmark, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom). 
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 Table 14 contains the results for Euro and non-Euro funds. The results are 
similar except for the variable PRICE. 
 Further results suggest no substantial differences between EURO and non-
EURO fund preferences before and after the financial crisis. 
 
Table 14 – Regression by EURO or non-EURO Fund Preferences 
Independent variables were measured at the beginning of each of the analyzed quarters, 
dependent variable at the end. The definition of the dependent and the independent variables is 
available on section 3.3.2. Columns represent separate estimations. We use a Censored (TOBIT) 
model left censored on 0 and right censored on 100. We use Huber-White-corrected standard 
errors to compensate for Heteroscedasticity (Huber (1967), White (1980)) (t-Statistics in 
parentheses). 
  2008-Q1   2011-Q1 
  EURO non-EURO   EURO non-EURO 
Intercept -7.48* -9.18*   -7.89* -12.26* 
  (-23.74) (-25.12)   (-27.07) (-33.37) 
PRICE 0.07* -0.36*   0.05* -0.41* 
  (3.49) (-13.55)   (2.84) (-14.18) 
SIZE 0.37* 0.52*   0.41* 0.65* 
  (22.05) (25.92)   (27.02) (31.67) 
LIQUIDITY 0.17* 0.34*   0.08* 0.39* 
  (6.05) (9.99)   (2.77) (10.38) 
AGE -0.08* -0.06   -0.07* 0.10* 
  (-2.63) (-1.48)   (-2.38) (2.53) 
MOMENTUM 0.01 -0.32*   -0.26* -0.07* 
  (0.32) (-4.35)   (-5.31) (-2.20) 
DIVYIELD 0.15* 0.22*   0.02 0.19* 
  (4.20) (5.60)   (0.56) (4.79) 
BTM 0.74 -0.04   0.45* -0.90* 
  (1.61) (-0.15)   (2.75) (-2.72) 
VARIANCE -2.55* -3.56*   -2.49* -1.69 
  (-1.97) (-2.83)   (-2.14) (-1.79) 
DUMMY_STOXX600 4.66* 7.81*   6.90* 12.66* 
  (7.32) (8.41)   (11.54) (14.16) 
SIZE*DUMMY_STOXX600 -0.23* -0.38*   -0.33* -0.61* 
  (-7.96) (-9.23)   (-12.22) (-15.20) 
*Significant at the 5% level 
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4.4. Preferences by Investment Fund Characteristics 
 
Investment styles 
 We also compare investment fund preferences by investment style. Thomson 
Reuters categorizes investment funds into a total of 16 groups based on its specific 
knowledge of the historic investment behavior of these funds. These groups include 
Growth, Value, Yield, Sector specific, Mixed style and Hedge Funds, among other 
categories (Thomson Reuters (2013) provides a detailed description of each category it 
uses to categorize funds). Since several of these groups have only a small number of 
funds, and therefore are unsuitable for comparison purposes, we further grouped these 
categories into four classes of funds based on their description. The four final classes 
were Growth, Value, Specialty and Others.  
 Growth funds are funds that generally invest in mid or large capitalization and 
are willing to pay a premium in Price-to-Earnings ratio for growth over the long term. 
On the other hand, Value funds focus on buying companies at relatively low valuations 
when measured by the Price-to-Earnings ratio. These funds prefer companies that are 
undervalued when compared to the industry sector, the overall market or themselves at 
an earlier date. 
 Specialty funds, on the other hand, are one of the 16 groups defined by Thomson 
Reuters and are used to categorize a fund that does not meet the criteria for any of the 
other 15 investment styles. These may be funds that hold a particularly high 
concentration of a single stock or a very small set of stocks, or specialize in convertible 
securities. Specialty funds are the ones in the highest number, as categorized by 
Thomson Reuters. Finally, funds we classify as “Others” are the funds that do not meet 
any of the requirements described for the groups above (i.e. Thomson Reuters attributes 
them to other groups) but are not enough to be used on a comparison alone due to lack 
of observations. We include all these funds on this specific group. 
 Table 15 shows the estimation results for the four instrument styles. Panel A 
contains the estimations for the 2008-Q1 data sample and panel B the estimations for 
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the 2011-Q1 sample. Coefficients for almost all independent variables have the same 
signal, statistical significance is almost always the same and the absolute values are in 
the same range. The results suggest that regardless of the investment style, the preferred 
characteristics of funds are the same. 
 
Table 15 – Regression by Investment Style 
Independent variables were measured at the beginning of each of the analyzed quarters, 
dependent variable at the end. The definition of the dependent and the independent variables is 
available on section 3.3.2. Columns represent separate estimations. We use a Censored (TOBIT) 
model left censored on 0 and right censored on 100. We use Huber-White-corrected standard 
errors to compensate for Heteroscedasticity (Huber (1967), White (1980)) (t-Statistics in 
parentheses). 
Panel A: 2008-Q1 data sample 
  Specialty Growth Value Others 
Intercept -7.61* -8.51* -7.15* -6.64* 
  (-24.22) (-24.50) (-27.26) (-23.66) 
PRICE -0.22* -0.22* -0.08* -0.09* 
  (-9.98) (-8.98) (-5.20) (-4.76) 
SIZE 0.41* 0.43* 0.35* 0.34* 
  (23.95) (23.13) (25.11) (21.33) 
LIQUIDITY 0.32* 0.25* 0.21* 0.15* 
  (10.35) (8.42) (9.58) (6.20) 
AGE 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.08* 
  (0.28) (-0.34) (-1.13) (-2.57) 
MOMENTUM -0.23* -0.01 -0.13* -0.09 
  (-3.58) (-0.27) (-2.60) (-1.67) 
DIVYIELD 0.25* 0.07 0.09* 0.19* 
  (7.24) (1.75) (3.54) (5.86) 
BTM -0.13 -0.09 0.14 0.44 
  (-0.59) (-0.34) (0.41) (1.33) 
VARIANCE -4.19* -2.71 -0.70 -1.00 
  (-3.42) (-1.69) (-1.31) (-1.30) 
DUMMY_STOXX600 7.67* 6.55* 4.98* 4.03* 
  (10.18) (9.79) (10.04) (6.09) 
SIZE*DUMMY_STOXX600 -0.38* -0.31* -0.23* -0.19* 
 
(-11.39) (-10.45) (-10.50) (-6.36) 
Number of funds 404 166 141 222 
*Significant at the 5% level 
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Panel B: 2011-Q1 data sample 
  Specialty Growth Value Others 
Intercept -9.79* -8.54* -10.11* -7.71* 
  (-30.43) (-28.95) (-34.88) (-25.31) 
PRICE -0.29* -0.21* -0.10* -0.10* 
  (-12.57) (-9.34) (-5.66) (-4.81) 
SIZE 0.51* 0.43* 0.50* 0.38* 
  (29.47) (26.70) (30.95) (22.75) 
LIQUIDITY 0.36* 0.10* 0.27* 0.09* 
  (11.39) (3.26) (11.54) (3.40) 
AGE 0.10* 0.05 0.05 0.01 
  (2.86) (1.64) (1.77) (0.50) 
MOMENTUM -0.08* -0.05* -0.15* -0.05* 
  (-2.70) (-2.20) (-4.71) (-2.09) 
DIVYIELD 0.13* 0.07* 0.04 0.14* 
  (4.01) (2.29) (1.52) (4.41) 
BTM -0.26 -0.50* -0.23 -0.53 
  (-1.39) (-1.99) (-0.75) (-1.96) 
VARIANCE -4.40* -0.30 0.27 -0.05 
  (-4.04) (-0.51) (0.97) (-0.09) 
DUMMY_STOXX600 10.87* 7.44* 9.51* 6.90* 
  (14.02) (12.03) (19.04) (10.36) 
SIZE*DUMMY_STOXX600 -0.53* -0.35* -0.45* -0.32* 
  (-15.34) (-12.55) (-19.67) (-10.71) 
Number of funds 393 160 137 205 
*Significant at the 5% level 
 
 
Investment fund turnover 
 Another classification that is available from Thomson Reuters’ One Banker – 
Ownership module is the turnover6 of each fund. Thomson Reuters classifies each fund 
into one of three classes (Low, Moderate and High turnover), but some funds have this 
classification empty. A fund with turnover classified as “Low” has an annual turnover 
rate that is less than 50%, or an average holding period of above two years, indicating 
that the fund has a general preference for long-term investment. Funds with Moderate 
turnover have an annual turnover rate of between 50% and 100%, or an average holding 
                                                          
6
 A fund’s turnover represents the portion of a fund's holdings that are bought and sold during the course 
of a year. 
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period of between 1 and 2 years, and therefore we assume they belong to a profile of 
medium term investment horizon. Funds classified as “High” turnover have an annual 
portfolio turnover rate higher than 100%, an indication of either a short term investment 
horizon or more frequent trading around a core position. 
 We analyze whether the time horizon of each fund manager may impact the 
fund’s stock preferences. 
 Table 16 presents the estimation results. Panel A contains the estimations for the 
2008-Q1 data sample; panel B contains the estimations for the 2011-Q1 sample. 
 The sign of the coefficients shown on Table 16 are the same as observed for the 
entire sample of investment funds (section 4.1).  Yet we can observe a somewhat 
cascading effect when we compare the Low, Moderate and High turnover funds 
especially on the SIZE, LIQUIDITY and EURO STOXX 600 dummy variable. 
Investment funds classified with Low turnover generally are more inclined to invest in 
larger, more liquid companies and that pay higher dividends when compared with funds 
classified with Moderate turnover or High turnover. Moreover, funds classified with 
Moderate turnover seem also more inclined to invest in larger and more liquid 
companies than funds classified with High turnover. This suggests that funds that are 
more inclined to invest in the long-term exhibit more strictly the preferences towards 
“prudent” stocks, as referred on section 2.2. The same principle can be used inversely: 
the results suggest that funds with short term horizon are less conservative, in terms of 
investing in larger, more “prudent” stocks. 
 While the coefficient on DIVYIELD is statistically significant for Low turnover 
funds, it is not for Moderate or High turnover funds. And while low turnover funds 
seem to dislike MOMENTUM stocks, high turnover funds seem to praise that 
characteristic. 
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Table 16 – Regression by Turnover Rate 
We use the Turnover Rate classification as given by Thomson Reuters to divide investment 
funds into four categories: Low, Moderate, High and unclassified (empty). Independent 
variables were measured at the beginning of each of the analyzed quarters, dependent variable at 
the end. The definition of the dependent and the independent variables is available on section 
3.3.2. Columns represent separate estimations. We use a Censored (TOBIT) model left censored 
on 0 and right censored on 100. We use Huber-White-corrected standard errors to compensate 
for Heteroscedasticity (Huber (1967), White (1980)) (t-Statistics in parentheses). 
Panel A: 2008-Q1 data sample 
  Low Moderate High (Not available) 
Intercept -8.67* -7.79* -4.52* -6.14* 
  (-24.78) (-26.54) (-21.88) (-23.73) 
PRICE -0.24* -0.19* -0.05* -0.10* 
  (-9.85) (-9.39) (-4.76) (-5.47) 
SIZE 0.46* 0.43* 0.21* 0.31* 
  (24.49) (27.21) (18.85) (21.76) 
LIQUIDITY 0.29* 0.28* 0.15* 0.20* 
  (8.85) (9.74) (9.93) (9.19) 
AGE 0.00 -0.14* 0.03 -0.02 
  (-0.03) (-4.66) (1.49) (-0.88) 
MOMENTUM -0.30* -0.10 0.06* -0.15* 
  (-4.48) (-1.64) (2.31) (-2.84) 
DIVYIELD 0.23* 0.08* 0.08* 0.13* 
  (6.01) (2.38) (3.92) (4.81) 
BTM -0.04 0.03 0.13 -0.13 
  (-0.15) (0.12) (0.60) (-0.65) 
VARIANCE -4.29* -2.46* -1.66* -1.19 
  (-2.75) (-1.97) (-1.99) (-1.88) 
DUMMY_STOXX600 7.14* 6.87* 2.73* 4.44* 
  (8.81) (10.58) (7.96) (7.68) 
SIZE*DUMMY_STOXX600 -0.35* -0.33* -0.14* -0.21* 
  (-9.75) (-11.50) (-8.80) (-8.04) 
Number of funds 386 288 88 171 
*Significant at the 5% level 
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Panel B: 2011-Q1 data sample 
  Low Moderate High (Not available) 
Intercept -11.15* -8.71* -4.45* -6.82* 
  (-34.53) (-30.89) (-22.36) (-25.31) 
PRICE -0.30* -0.17* -0.04* -0.12* 
  (-11.75) (-9.05) (-4.14) (-7.13) 
SIZE 0.58* 0.46* 0.21* 0.33* 
  (32.13) (29.64) (20.57) (23.52) 
LIQUIDITY 0.31* 0.18* 0.10* 0.18* 
  (9.26) (6.80) (7.22) (8.09) 
AGE 0.12* -0.05 0.02 0.06* 
  (3.45) (-1.81) (1.43) (2.33) 
MOMENTUM -0.12* -0.05* 0.00 -0.10* 
  (-3.80) (-1.99) (1.05) (-3.71) 
DIVYIELD 0.20* 0.04 0.01 0.07* 
  (5.51) (1.52) (0.59) (2.70) 
BTM -0.55 -0.36 -0.28* -0.02 
  (-1.95) (-1.21) (-4.17) (-0.13) 
VARIANCE -1.87 -0.16 -0.33 -2.14* 
  (-1.73) (-0.28) (-1.50) (-2.61) 
DUMMY_STOXX600 11.44* 9.14* 4.41* 5.73* 
  (15.06) (15.91) (15.34) (10.24) 
SIZE*DUMMY_STOXX600 -0.56* -0.43* -0.21* -0.27* 
  (-16.30) (-16.68) (-15.75) (-10.74) 
Number of funds 384 283 91 137 
*Significant at the 5% level 
 
 
 
4.5. Preferences by Domestic or Foreign Investment 
 
 We further analyze preferences of the investment funds included in our sample 
when they engage in domestic or foreign investment. Our goal is to understand up to 
which extent investment funds use the same criteria to invest in domestic and in foreign 
markets. In order to calculate stock ownership by investment funds on “Domestic” 
investment, for each stock we sum the total ownership by funds located in the same 
country as that stock. To calculate institutional ownership on “Foreign” investment, we 
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sum the total ownership by funds in countries other than that of the stock. We then 
perform the regressions based on this data. 
 Table 17 displays the estimation results. Except for VARIANCE, the most 
relevant variables such as SIZE, LIQUIDITY and the EURO STOXX 600 dummy are 
still statistically significant in all cases. In terms of the sign of the estimated 
coefficients, the coefficients are consistent except for PRICE. For PRICE, intermittent 
signals on this variable may suggest that investment funds tend to prefer lower-priced 
stocks on their respective domestic markets and higher-priced stocks on foreign 
markets. 
 Note that in accordance with the other analyses we perform in this dissertation 
the figures on Table 17 only consider funds and stocks located in the 15 countries under 
analysis (i.e. we exclude funds located in other countries and stocks from other markets, 
which could impact the results obtained). 
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Table 17 – Regression by Domestic or Foreign Investment 
Independent variables were measured at the beginning of each of the analyzed quarters, 
dependent variable at the end. The definition of the dependent and the independent variables is 
available on section 3.3.2. Columns represent separate estimations. We use a Censored (TOBIT) 
model left censored on 0 and right censored on 100. We use Huber-White-corrected standard 
errors to compensate for Heteroscedasticity (Huber (1967), White (1980)) (t-Statistics in 
parentheses). 
  
2008-Q1 2011-Q1 
  
Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign 
Intercept -8.48* -8.27* -11.10* -9.69* 
  (-23.17) (-25.69) (-30.65) (-30.79) 
PRICE -0.37* 0.07* -0.44* 0.07* 
  (-13.67) (3.66) (-15.55) (3.91) 
SIZE 0.46* 0.43* 0.57* 0.51* 
  (22.96) (25.39) (28.56) (30.13) 
LIQUIDITY 0.32* 0.24* 0.28* 0.28* 
  (9.12) (8.29) (7.15) (10.52) 
AGE 0.00 -0.12* 0.17* -0.11* 
  (0.06) (-4.08) (4.26) (-3.76) 
MOMENTUM -0.24* -0.14* -0.08* -0.15* 
  (-3.23) (-2.26) (-2.48) (-4.22) 
DIVYIELD 0.33* 0.03 0.26* -0.06* 
  (8.15) (0.90) (6.40) (-2.06) 
BTM -0.05 0.71 -0.64* 0.28* 
  (-0.22) (1.55) (-2.07) (2.72) 
VARIANCE -4.34* -2.55 -2.77 -1.45 
  (-3.03) (-1.91) (-1.88) (-1.85) 
DUMMY_STOXX600 8.51* 4.54* 11.86* 8.55* 
  (8.11) (6.42) (11.05) (12.91) 
SIZE*DUMMY_STOXX600 -0.41* -0.22* -0.58* -0.41* 
  (-8.92) (-7.02) (-11.96) (-13.70) 
*Significant at the 5% level 
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5. Conclusions 
 We find evidence that European investment funds tend to invest primarily in 
larger, more liquid, high dividend, low volatility stocks that belong to the main stock 
market indices and tend to avoid stocks with higher levels of 12-month positive 
momentum. 
 The findings in this dissertation are generally consistent with previous studies 
examining U.S. funds (e.g. Falkenstein (1996) and Gompers and Metrick (2001)). These 
studies also find a predominance of preference for larger, more liquid stocks and an 
avoidance of stocks with positive Momentum. Furthermore, our results that investment 
funds tend to prefer stocks that belong to the main stock market indices are in 
accordance to Gompers and Metrick’s results (Falkenstein does not use this variable). 
 Our findings are also in line with previous studies that suggest that funds tilt 
their portfolios to more “prudent” stocks (e.g. Badrinath et al. (1989)). The main 
observed tendency for funds to prefer larger, more liquid, less volatile stocks that 
belong to the main stock market indices suggests that funds choose stocks they perceive 
as more prudent when managing their portfolios. 
 We find no statistically significant differences in preferences between PIIGS 
(Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain) and non-PIIGS funds, and between different 
fund investment styles. 
 We find no statistically significant difference between funds located in countries 
that adopted the Euro versus funds located in other countries, except for the variable 
Stock Price; and between domestic or foreign investment, also except for the variable 
Stock Price. When comparing preferences by fund turnover, our results suggest that 
low-turnover funds (typically with a long-term horizon) exhibit more strongly “prudent” 
man law investment behavior than high-turnover funds. 
 Our results contribute to fill a gap in research since previous studies of the 
preferences of institutions were almost entirely based on U.S. institutional fund data. 
This dissertation may help individual investors become more informed about the 
behavior of institutions that manage their savings in a fiduciary relationship, and our 
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results and those of similar studies may be useful to the regulation and supervision of 
prudent-man laws. 
 Although covering different aspects of institutional preference, this investigation 
has important limitations. Our studies use only two snapshots of data, the first quarter of 
2008 and the first quarter of 2011. Also, our research is based only on European stocks 
from 15 countries. This does not allow for a full description of institutional preferences 
throughout the World. 
 Due to these limitations, future studies could make use of time-series cross-
sectional variation in the data to learn more about investment fund preferred stock 
characteristics. 
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Appendix I: Evidence of Heteroscedasticity 
 
 As shown below, we have evidence of heteroscedasticity on the data samples 
used in our study. Heteroscedasticity, or the absence of homoscedasticity, exists when 
the variance of the dependent variable varies between subsamples of the data sample 
under study. Figure I.1 shows a graphical representation of the relationship between our 
dependent variable, Institutional Ownership, and company size as given by each 
company’s market capitalization. Both variables are in natural logarithms, as seen on 
the figure. Our evidence of heteroscedasticity based on this figure comes intuitively 
from the fact that the dispersion of the dependent variable for log(SIZE) between 18 and 
22 is higher than between, say, 12 and 16. Figure I.2 displays the average variance for 
subgroups of log(SIZE) based on the same data. Since more formally the existence of 
heteroscedasticity should be proven by using a statistical test designed specifically to 
test for this effect, we use the White’s test for Heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). The 
null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is rejected, as shown in table I.1. 
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Figure I.1 – Evidence of Heteroscedasticity on Sample. 
Scatter plot of our dependent variable, Institutional Ownership, by company size. The 
dependent variable is expressed as the natural logarithm of one plus a value between 0 and 100 
that is equal to the percentage of each stock that is owned by European investment funds 
multiplied by 100. Size is the natural logarithm of the market value of each stock, expressed in 
Euros. It is also expressed in natural logarithms on the chart. Source: data sample for 2008-Q1. 
 
 Note that due to the inexistence of a more adequate test, this test was performed 
based on a known biased and inconsistent OLS regression of the dependent variable on 
the independent variables. The cause for the bias and inconsistency is the inclusion of 
observations with institutional ownership equal to zero (i.e. stocks not owned by any 
investment fund). 
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Figure I.2 - Evidence of Heteroscedasticity on Sample (complement to Figure I.1). 
Institutional ownership variance figures by sub-segments of Size. The dependent variable, 
Institutional Ownership, is expressed as the natural logarithm of one plus a value between 0 and 
100 that is equal to the percentage of each stock that is owned by European investment funds 
multiplied by 100. Size is the natural logarithm of the market value of each stock, expressed in 
Euros. It is also expressed in natural logarithms on the chart. Source: data sample for 2008-Q1. 
 
 
 
 
Table I.1 – Results of White’s test for Heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). 
As shown on the table, the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is rejected. The dependent 
variable, Institutional Ownership, is expressed as the natural logarithm of one plus a value 
between 0 and 100 that is equal to the percentage of each stock that is owned by European 
investment funds multiplied by 100. Independent variables are Price, Size, Liquidity, Age, 12-
month Momentum, Dividend Yield, Book-to-market ratio, Variance, and the dummy variable 
for presence on the EURO STOXX 600 index. Independent variables are expressed in 
logarithms whenever possible. Due to the inexistence of a more adequate test, this test was 
performed based on a known biased and inconsistent OLS regression of the dependent variable 
on the independent variables due to the inclusion of observations with institutional ownership 
equal to zero (i.e. stocks not owned by any investment fund). Source: data sample for 2008-Q1. 
Heteroscedasticity Test: White 
F-statistic 5.628711     Prob. F(75,4175) 0.00 
Obs*R-squared 390.3663     Prob. Chi-Square(75) 0.00 
Scaled explained SS 396.7233     Prob. Chi-Square(75) 0.00 
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Appendix II: Summary Statistics on Selected Independent Variables 
 
 
Table II.1 – Summary Statistics on Selected Independent Variables Used on this Study, divided by Country. 
Selected statistics were calculated based on Thomson Reuters’ Datastream / Datastream Worldscope data. All values are mean values. Only data sample 
2008-Q1 was included since the values for data sample 2011-Q1 are similar. The definition of each independent variable is available on section 3.3.2. 
 Country Return Variance Size (€ Millions) Liquidity Price (€) Div Yield Age Momentum 12m BTM Number of stocks* 
United Kingdom 0.03 886 5.1 9.1 1.7 136 -16.7 0.4 1780 
Germany 0.03 997 0.6 78.3 2.1 133 3.5 0.4 892 
France 0.13 1416 3.3 85.3 2.1 132 2.2 1.4 814 
Sweden 0.36 561 9.7 5.4 2.1 94 -2.5 0.3 423 
Italy 0.01 1555 5.9 7.7 2.1 138 -6.7 0.5 294 
Greece 0.03 380 3.7 6.6 1.7 139 14.7 0.4 282 
Denmark 0.02 571 2.8 100.0 1.5 172 -8.4 0.4 201 
Netherlands 0.01 2033 6.3 22.3 2.7 217 -3.2 0.4 153 
Spain 0.01 3138 6.7 22.0 1.9 153 -4.2 0.3 152 
Belgium 0.02 1069 2.4 216.1 2.4 153 4.9 0.3 147 
Finland 0.01 1166 4.7 11.3 3.6 135 1.9 0.4 130 
Austria 0.02 1064 4.2 52.7 1.8 145 2.1 0.2 102 
Ireland 0.02 787 3.5 4.6 1.5 168 -20.5 0.7 68 
Portugal 0.03 1141 3.0 5.5 1.9 168 14.4 0.4 54 
Luxembourg 0.01 2619 2.0 117.3 3.5 120 10.6 0.3 31 
*Reference number (varies according to the availability of each of the indicators) 
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Appendix III: Summary Statistics for Stocks Not Owned by any 
Fund in Sample 
 
 Table III.1 shows summary statistics for explanatory variables considering only 
the 43% and 46% stocks not owned by any fund for the data samples 2008-Q1 and 
2011-Q1, as described in Table 4. Comparing these figures with those obtained for the 
entire sample, as given in Table 6, we find that stocks not owned by any fund are 
considerably smaller, have higher variance of returns, have less liquidity, distribute less 
dividends, refer on average to younger companies and generally have higher book-to-
market ratios. These findings are consistent with the results we obtain for the entire 
sample of investment funds in section 4.1 in that these funds tend to prefer larger, more 
liquid, less volatile stocks. 
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Table III.1 - Descriptive Statistics for Stocks not owned by any fund 
Selected figures are taken at the beginning of the quarter under study. Panel A refers to quarter 
2008-Q1 and panel B to quarter 2011-Q1. Return Variance is the variance of returns. Size is 
market capitalization in EUR millions. Liquidity is transaction volume in percentage of shares 
traded on the last month prior to the beginning of the quarter. Price is stock price, in euros. 
Dividend yield is the dividend distributed on the same year as the data sample, expressed in 
percentage of market price at the beginning of the quarter under analysis. Age is the number of 
months since the stock was first listed. 12-month momentum is the one-year returns. BTM is the 
book-to-market ratio of each stock. Data extracted from Thomson Reuters’ Datastream / 
Datastream Worldscope. 
  Panel A: 2008-Q1 sample 
Metric Return Variance 
Size (€ 
Millions) Liquidity 
Price 
(€) 
Div 
Yield 
Age 
(months) 
Momentum 
12m BTM 
Mean 0.11 178 3.60 50.5 1.51 113.4 -3.0 0.44 
Median 0.02 15 0.61 2.5 0.00 92.2 -9.8 0.62 
Maximum 0.54* 51,366 27.65* 942.7* 12.7* 524.4 169.8* 3.57* 
Minimum 0.00 0.1 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.9 -97.2 -0.13** 
                  
  Panel B: 2011-Q1 sample 
Metric Return Variance 
Size (€ 
Millions) Liquidity 
Price 
(€) 
Div 
Yield 
Age 
(months) 
Momentum 
12m BTM 
Mean 0.28 108 4.95 36.8 1.69 141.4 21.9 0.25 
Median 0.02 13 0.67 1.5 0.00 124.7 1.1 0.85 
Maximum 0.62* 19,429 41.73* 589.9* 14.4* 560.9 366.8* 7.14* 
Minimum 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.9 -99.1 -0.11** 
* Replaced by the 99.0% percentile to avoid extreme values 
** Replaced by the 1.0% percentile to avoid extreme values 
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